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1. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The World Bank estimates that African investment needs in infrastructure would cost 
US$93 billion per year, only half of which is for the power sector.1 As shown by the 
following table, some countries will need to more than double their existing generation, 
simply to meet the demand from mining customers, not to mention increased demand from 
local under-served populations. 
 
Estimate of additional electricity consumption from mineral projects in selected sub-


































                                                 
1
 C. Briceño-Garmendia, K. Smits, V. Foster, “Financing Public Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa: Patterns, 
Issues, and Options,” Africa Infrastructure Sector Diagnostic Background Paper No. 15 (Washington D.C.: The 
World Bank, 2008). 
2
 Donal I. Bleiwas, , Estimates of Electricity requirements for the recovery of mineral commodities, with examples 
applied to Sub-Saharan Africa, USGS,  2011 available at: http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2011/1253/report/OF11-1253.pdf 
 Estimated annual 
consumption ( GWh) 
% of 2008 generation 
capacity 
Angola 24 1% 
Botswana 260 44% 
Burkina Faso 550 93% 
Cameroon 560 10% 
CAR 190 119% 
Congo-Brazzaville 250 56% 
DRC 5600 75% 
Côte d'Ivoire 320 6% 
Eritrea 280 104% 
Gabon 480 24% 
Ghana 720 9% 
Guinea 1500 163% 
Kenya 100 1% 
Lesotho 210 105% 
Liberia 500 147% 
Madagascar 670 60% 
Malawi 80 5% 
Mali 360 73% 
Mauritania 530 96% 
Mozambique 160 1% 
Namibia 780 35% 
Niger 290 145% 
Senegal 790 35% 
Sierra Leone 870 1450% 
South Africa 6900 3% 
Tanzania 440 10% 
Zambia 2400 25% 
Zimbabwe 260 3% 
TOTAL 26074 8% 
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According to the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic conducted by the World Bank, 
Africa faces an annual infrastructure funding gap of US$31 billion.  
 
At the same time, mining companies operating in sub-Saharan Africa are increasingly 
concerned about the limits or absence of electricity, increasing power costs, and more 
stringent power regulations. In South Africa, the lack of power has already heavily 
impacted the mining industry. In 2008, because of the power crisis, AngloGold Ashanti, for 
example, lost 270,000 ounces of gold production. After a five day shutdown, the authorities 
ordered the country's largest mineral producers to restart operations using no more than 
90% of the previous power supply, in order to avoid new blackouts. 3 Indeed, in South 
Africa, the energy intensive mining sector accounts for approximately 17% of the national 
electricity consumption.4  
 
The availability of power lies at the core of a mine’s development strategy; mining 
operators need to make sure that the energy demand of mining operations is met. This is 
especially the case in remote areas, where mining companies are developing large projects 
with little or no connectivity to national grids and very limited options for electricity 
supply.  
 
To address these energy problems, the mining industry has adopted different solutions 
depending on the power situation of the country, the projects’ energy demand, and the 
projects’ distance from the grid:   
- When sourcing from the grid is too expensive5  or when there is no grid, industry 
finances and builds its own power generation facilities or sources from a third-party that is 
a private power generator (Section 3 and 4) 
- When sourcing from the grid is less expensive than own generation, industry either 
sources from the grid or finances/co-finances the upgrade of the power assets under 
various arrangements with the public utility (Section 5). 
 
For a mining company, the goal is to maximize cost-savings. For a host country, the 
challenge is to maximize welfare gains by leveraging any investment in power 
infrastructure development for the electrification needs of the country. This could be 
through connecting the mine to the grid and incentivizing the company to produce extra 
capacity to sell to the public utility in order to increase supply and reduce the electricity 
cost, or by requiring that the privately- financed network is open to third-party access, so 
that towns and populations between the mine and the grid benefit from the privately 
financed distribution lines as well.  
 
Both, cost savings and welfare gains can be met simultaneously if sound regulations and 
efficient coordination mechanisms are in place.   
 
                                                 
3AngloGold Ashanti, “AngloGold Ashanti’s response to the power crisis,” Case Studies: South Africa, available at: 
http://www.anglogold.com/subwebs/informationforinvestors/reports08/power-crisis.htm.   
4
 Republic of South Africa, Energy Efficiency Strategy for South Africa (Pretoria: Department of Minerals and 
Energy, April 2004). 
5
 On average in Africa, the cost is 18 cts/kWh average for grid-supplied power and 40 cts/kWh when firms pay for 
backup generators to avoid blackouts 
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Without appropriate regulation, the opportunity for the country will be missed. In DRC, for 
instance, after the development of the mining project of Tenke Fungurume, the 
surrounding communities suffered from increased power supply shortages.6 The mining 
company refused to share its power generation infrastructure with the city, despite 
repeated requests from the local population. For a variety of reasons, the project has now 
become so controversial that the government threatens to expropriate the company.7 
 
Without appropriate coordination mechanisms within the mining industry or between the 
industry and the government, scale economies will be lost.  In Liberia, a World Bank study 
suggests that a single cost-effective large-scale power plant supplying all the mining sites, 
with a built in surplus to be sold to the state-owned utility, instead of many smaller 
decentralized thermal power plants, could result in “aggregate savings of US$ 1.6 billion  in 
lifecycle energy costs over the next 20 years”. 8  
 
Therefore to take advantage of the opportunity of the investments of the mining industry in 
power infrastructure, and make sure that the country benefits from those investments, an 
appropriate planning, regulatory and commercial framework is needed.  If power assets 
are leveraged and designed to contribute to the development of public infrastructure at the 
national, regional or community levels, the incremental capital cost of building additional 
capacity could be reduced and the economic and social spillover effects can extend far 
beyond the mining sector. 
 
The purpose of this working paper is to distil good practice principles observed in 
power infrastructure development leveraging the mining industry’s energy demand 
around the world, informed by expert opinion.  
 
 
2. CONTEXT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
2.1. The case for public private coordination for investment in power assets  
 
Coordination within the mining industry and between mining companies and the 
government can result in significant economic gains. Indeed the underlying fact is that 
the marginal capital cost of additional generation capacity is generally lower than 
the cost of building a whole new power plant.  
 
According to calculations based on U.S. Energy Information Administration data,9 for 
example, the overnight capital costs per kilowatt installed for a coal power plant of 
1,300MW are roughly 10% lower than a plant which has half the same size (650 MW).  
 
                                                 
6Price Kumwamba and Anne-Sophie Simpere, “Soul mining: the EIB’s role in the Tenke-Fungurume Mine, DRC” 
(Kinshasa and Paris: Action Against Impunity For Human Rights – Friends of the Earth France, August 2008), 
available at: www.bothends.org/uploaded_files/Soul_Mining.pdf. 
7
“Partners give ground to agree Tenke Fungurume terms,” Mining Journal, October 22, 2010, available at: 
http://www.mining-journal.com/finance/partners-give-ground-to-agree-tenke-fungurume-terms. 
8
 World Bank, “Leveraging investments by natural resource concessionaires,” Infrastructure Policy Notes, World 
Bank for the Republic of Liberia (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2011) 
9
 BCS, “Mining Industry Energy Bandwidth Study,” Report to U.S. Department of Energy, 2007, op. cit. 
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This, in part, reflects the fixed costs in constructing a power plant (obtaining land, permits, 
design etc.) As a result, if we consider the capital cost of the incremental 650MW (in the big 
power plant of 1300MW) and we compare this capital cost with the capital cost of the first 
650MW, we obtain a 20% reduction to the ultimate consumer in the capital cost of the 
additional 650MW generated from that plant. 
 
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), hydro power plants could also provide 
significant economies of scale. In terms of run-of-rivers plants10, investments costs 
decrease from US$ 2- US$ 4 million/MW to US$ 2 - US$ 3 million/MW as power plant 
capacity increases from less than 10MW to 10-100MW. In terms of dams and reservoirs11, 
which tend to have more capacity, investments costs decrease from US$ 2-US$3 
million/MW to less than US$ 2 million/MW as power plant capacity increases from 100-
300MW  to more than 300 MW. 12 
 
Moreover, for hydro-plants, as most of the generation cost is associated with the 
depreciation of fixed assets, the generation cost decreases if the projected plant lifetime is 
extended or capacity is expanded. According to the International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA), average installed costs for adding extra capacity or renovating the 
hydroelectric power plants range from US$ 500/kW to US$ 1,000/kW, a smaller 
investment per kilowatt than for building a new power plant. This suggests that there could 
be additional economies of scale if a plant was refurbished or upgraded.13   
 
Therefore this is often more economically rational to coordinate investments in power 
generation operating in a country in order not to miss scale economies: one bigger 
power plant serving a mining area is often less expensive to all users than many 
individual power plants set up at each mine site. 
 
 
2.2. Avenues to leverage the mining industry’s energy demand will depend on the commodity 
and mine type 
 
Energy requirements vary considerably for each commodity. According to a US 
Department of Energy study14, coal mining and metals mining (iron, lead, gold, zinc, and 
copper) have roughly equivalent energy needs, requiring around 160,000 Btu/ton 
                                                 
10
 Run-of-river: this type of project normally has no or very little storage capacity. Generally, small plants are more 
likely to be run-of-river facilities. 
11
 Dams and reservoirs are of two types – 1) reservoir:  this type of power plant has the ability to store water in a 
reservoir in order to de-couple generation from hydro inflows. Reservoir capacities can be small or very large ; 2) 
pumped storage: this type of scheme uses off-peak electricity to pump water from a lower elevation reservoir to a 
higher elevation so that the pumped storage plant can generate power at peak times and enhance grid stability. 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), “Renewable energy technologies: cost analysis series,” Volume 
1: Power sector, IRENA Working Paper (2012), available at:  
http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/RE_Technologies_Cost_Analysis-HYDROPOWER.pdf 
12International Energy Agency (IEA), “Renewable Energy Essentials: Hydropower” (2010), available at: 
http://www.iea.org/papers/2010/Hydropower_Essentials.pdf   
13
 IRENA, “Renewable energy technologies: cost analysis series,” 2012, op. cit. 
14BCS, “Mining Industry Energy Bandwidth Study,” Report to U.S. Department of Energy, June 2007, available at: 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/manufacturing/industries_technologies/mining/pdfs/mining_bandwidth.pdf. 
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(0.05MWh/ton) of material handled. However, when recovery ratios (percentage of 
valuable ore within the total mined material) are taken into account, metals mining is 
generally much more energy intensive than coal mining, as coal mining has a recovery ratio 
of 82% on average, while for metals, the average ratio is approximately 4.5%. Among 
metals, gold and silver have the lowest recovery ratio of 0.005%. Further technological 
improvements are in great demand in the mining industry, as they reduce the quantity of 
waste material handled and improve energy efficiency in the industry. 
 
Energy use in mining also depends on the extent to which the commodity must be 
beneficiated or processed, and also on whether it is underground or surface. Due to a 
significant increase in hauling requirements, ventilation, water pumping, and other 
operations, underground mining operations require significantly greater amounts of 
energy than surface mining operations. According to the same U.S. Department of Energy 
study mentioned above, underground coal mining in the United States, for example, 
requires 325,000 Btu/ton of coal recovered, compared to 55,000-77,000 Btu/ton for 
surface operations. The US Geological Survey’s estimates for coal energy needs in sub-
Saharan Africa are between 185,000 Btu/ ton for underground and 61,000 Btu/ton for 
surface mining15.   
 
According to the same U.S. Department of Energy study, the major energy sources used in 
the U.S. mining industry include diesel fuel accounting for 34%, followed by onsite 
electricity at 32%, and natural gas at 22%. Coal and gasoline supply the rest of the energy.16 
Electricity is generally used for ventilation systems, water pumping, and crushing and 
grinding operations, while diesel fuel is used for hauling and other transportation 
processes.17 This breakdown of energy sources can of course differ in other areas such as in 
Africa but the idea remains that electricity is one of the energy sources used by the mine.   
Its portion in the energy needs of the mining industry is however significant enough to 
be an opportunity for the host country to leverage in order to improve its power 
infrastructure.  
 
2.3. Avenues to leverage the mining industry’s energy demand will depend on the energy 
sources of the country 
 
Sourcing electricity from the grid in a country rich in hydropower sources is cheaper than 
in a country relying on thermal sources.  
 
According to EIA estimates18, U.S. average Levelized Maintenance & Operation Costs for 
hydro power plants are US$10/MWh, less than the US$32.6/MWh for conventional coal 
                                                 
15
 Bleiwas, , Estimates of Electricity requirements for the recovery of mineral commodities, with examples applied 
to Sub-Saharan Africa, USGS,  2011, op.cit 
16
 BCS, “Mining Industry Energy Bandwidth Study,” Report to U.S. Department of Energy , June 2007, op.cit. 
17
 U.S. Department of Energy, “Energy and Environmental Profile of the U.S. Mining Industry” 2002, available at: 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/manufacturing/industries_technologies/mining/pdfs/overview.pdf  
18
 U,S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) “Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual 
Energy Outlook 2012”, January 23, 2012 U.S. Energy Information Administration available at 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/electricity_generation.cfm 
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plants. Those numbers contribute to a smaller total system levelized cost of hydropower 
than thermal power (US$ 89.9/Mwh and US$ 99.6/Mwh respectively).19.  
 
Hydropower, when associated with storage in reservoirs, can store energy sometimes over 
years and can supply big quantities of energy at cheaper costs than any other energy 
source. Hence, sourcing electricity from a hydro-grid is cheaper than sourcing from a 
thermal grid or thermal power sources (such as diesel generators or coal-fired power 
plant) even in countries where the grid is not functional and the non-industrial demand is 
low such as in DRC (see box 23).   Of course many countries will rely on a grid based on a 
mix of hydro and thermal energy sources especially given that hydro facilities require 
massive amounts of water and can be rain-dependent.  
 
In addition to the regulatory framework, the type of available energy source as well as 
the type of mine will determine the power sourcing options for the mine and the 
potential for leveraging those options for the benefit of the host country. 
 
 
2.4.  Research questions and summary of issues 
 
A worldwide survey of existing institutional arrangements of power sourcing 
options for mining companies shows the existence of several common barriers that 
hinder the incidence of mutually beneficial coordination either between mining 
companies and the government or within the mining industry itself:  
1. Planning in the mining industry utilizes a different time-span from that of 
government agencies, making coordination of investments difficult. 
2. Mining companies may perceive reliable power supply and earlier access to power 
as a competitive advantage, which makes resource pooling and joint strategy 
formulation within the mining industry rare. 
3. Mine investors generally have little incentive to construct power plants with greater 
capacity than their mine’s demand if no incentivizing regulatory and commercial 
framework is in place. For instance, appropriate legislation for mining companies’ 
power generation does not always exist or does not properly address the possibility 
of selling electricity to the grid. 
4. Mining often takes place in remote areas and building the distribution grid up to the 
mine concession results in an expensive undertaking that the government cannot 
always afford and that the mine is not always interested in financing. In this 
situation, the only way for the country to benefit is for the mine site community to 
be supplied in electricity by the mine. When this is not required by the contract and 
not part of an integrated local plan, this is often not a sustainable solution.  
 
The rest of the working paper will highlight situations where those barriers have 
been lifted, differentiating between the following cases: 
 
                                                 
19
 Adesh Sharma “Hydro Power Vs Thermal Power: A Comparative Cost-Benefit Analysis”, International Journal 
of Arts and Sciences 3(9): 125 - 143 (2010). See also Wood Mackenzie, “Clarifying specific concession models that 
are competitive,” Report to Greenland Development Inc. (GDI, 2009) op. cit. See also IRENA “Renewable energy 
technologies: cost analysis series,’ Volume 1: Power sector” (2012), op. cit. 
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- there is no grid or the grid is too remote from the mining area (Section 3),  
- sourcing power from the grid is more expensive than own-generation (Section 4 ) and  
- sourcing power from the grid is less expensive than own-generation (Section 5). 
 
The table below summarizes the different issues presented in this working paper. 
Situation  Mining  
reaction 




Issues tackled in the paper 
There is no 
grid or the 













-The mine helps the 
community with off-grid 
solutions as part of CSR 
-The mine helps the 
community upon contract 
requirements  
- The mine and the local 
government  share 
responsibility to give the 
mine-site  community access 
to electricity 
- The mining energy demand 
is leveraged to expand the 
grid up to remote areas 
-How to encourage mining 
companies’ contribution to the 
electrification of the community? 
-What should laws and contracts 
require? 
-What is the breakdown of 
responsibilities between the 
government, the company and 
the community? 
- If the grid is expanded, who is 
financing the expansion? 
Sourcing 
power from 














and sale to the 
grid  
-The mine doesn’t produce 
extra-capacity and only 
meets its own needs 
- The mine sells excess 
power to the utility 
- The mine sells excess 
power to end-users 
- The mine serves as an 
anchor customer for third-
party investment in power 
generation  
- What are the different elements 
of an appropriate regulatory 
framework to encourage the 
production of surplus to be sold 
to the grid: power sector reform, 
IPP, PPA, independent regulator? 
-What are the advantages of 
connecting the mines to the grid 
for the mines and for the grid? 
-How can governments 
encourage group power plants? 
Sourcing 
power from 














the mine’s own 
generation or 
encouraging the 
mine to invest in 
expanding and 
upgrading power 
assets to avoid a 
grid reaching 
capacity 
-The mine buys all power 
from the grid 
-The mine is encouraged to 
consume more of  its 
generators to alleviate the 
grid 
-The mine upgrades or 
expands the grid network  
and gets refunded or gets 
bills credits  
-If allowed, the mine builds 
and operates the additional 
network capacity  
-The mine resorts to smart 
technology to be producer 
and consumer 
-What are the existing 
commercial arrangements with 
the public utility to encourage 
more consumption of the idle 
capacity of own-site generators? 
-What are the existing 
commercial arrangements with 
the public utility to encourage 
the mining investment in the 
creation or upgrading of power 
assets? 
-What types of technological 
models are available to boost 
mining companies’ participation 
in the electricity market either as 




- What are the benefits of more coordination? 
- What kinds of coordination mechanisms exist between the company and the country? 
- How can countries align the power generation investments of individual mining projects with 
the national plan when mining plans are time-sensitive and public-private coordination takes 
time? 
- What are the consequences of the lack of coordination? 
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3. SITUATION ONE: THERE IS NO GRID OR THE GRID IS TOO REMOTE FROM THE MINING AREA 
 
In the situation where there is no grid, mining companies are forced to construct their own 
generation facilities. Without an established distribution/transmission system, the only 
way for host governments to benefit from mining investments is to encourage or require 
mining companies to supply electricity to local communities, either by building a micro-
grid around the mine site, or through the provision of off-grid distributed power systems. 
In this situation, the challenge for the government is to articulate a plan stating when 




3.1. Relying on off-grid supply to local communities 
 
Some mining companies insist on the provision of local electricity as part of their corporate 
social responsibility. In Papua New Guinea, for example, some neighboring villages have 
been supplied with a few solar panels, but such endeavors are not part of any mandatory or 
systematic program. As a matter of fact, the government of Papua New Guinea has even 
tried to make the local provision of electricity a contractual requirement but the loose 
language leaves the requirement to company’s judgment call (see box 1).  
 
Box 1: Papua New Guinea – Loose legal language and companies’ corporate social 
responsibility programs   
In Papua New Guinea, a standard mining development contract drafted in 201020 
introduces the possibility for the mining company to generate electric power in excess of 
the project’s needs in order to meet local rural requirements but also stipulates that “[t]he 
Company (Joint Venturers) shall under no circumstances be required to increase the 
capacity of its electric power supply facilities or transmission facilities beyond that 
required by the Approved Proposals for Development to meet the needs of any other users 
or to construct or maintain any off-site grid or distribution system.” 
 
Given this loose requirement, companies either invest in electricity generation exclusively 
for their own needs, or in some isolated cases, supply electricity to local communities as 
part of their corporate social responsibility program. As an incentive, the government also 
grants tax credits (Infrastructure Tax Credit Scheme (ITCS)) in exchange of spending up to 
0.75% of the value of the project’s gross sales on approved infrastructure projects. 21 
                                                 
20Standard Mining Development Contract Draft between the Independent State for Papua New Guinea and (name of 
the company) (2010), Article 5.7, available at:  
http://www.mmdaproject.org/presentations/PNG%20Full%20Revised%20Standard%20MDC.pdf. 
21Graene Hancock, “Sustainability of mining impacted communities in Papua New Guinea. Fiscal revenue sharing 
mechanisms: Status and Practice,” Workshop on sustainability and the governance of mining revenue sharing on 
April 4-5, 2001 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001), available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/miningtaxationghancock.pdf. 
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The owners of Lihir Gold Limited, for example, contracted with the Australian company 
Rainbow Power Company to install a US $164,000 project, including 8 solar panels, 12 
batteries, and 6 fluorescent lights on some villagers’ homes on Lihir Island.22 The operation 
was advertised as part of the corporate social responsibility initiatives of the company. 
 
Even if some of those projects have significantly contributed to the economic development 
of local communities, such projects are few and far between. Rarely do they fit into a 
systematic approach or into any regulatory framework. For instance in Guinea in the Siguiri 
mine, the company coordinated a plan with the local government to equip the community 
with electricity, but only after protests (see box 2).  
 
Box 2: Guinea – AngloGold Ashanti forced to procure the community with electricity 
to save its social license to operate 
In Guinea, “AngloGold Ashanti commissioned a new electric power line from Siguiri mine to 
the nearby town, and provided two Caterpillar generator sets to give the community 
1.2MW of power”,23 explains the World Gold Council on its website, but this initiative came 
as a result of villagers’ protests against AngloGold Ashanti for failing to provide services to 
the local community. With the electricity provision to the community, the company and the 
local government came up with a plan featuring the following breakdown of tasks between 
the parties24: 
- The government is responsible 1) for the design of the power transmission line and 
circuitry (the approval of the mine’s Engineering Department is needed to ensure 
compatibility and define boundaries); 2) for the maintenance of transformers, the 
overhead line and line switches for transmission reticulation; 3) for fuel supply to the 
generator sets.  
-The company is responsible for providing the generators to the town, maintaining the 
generator sets and the switchgear, shut the plant down once every week for three hours to 
conduct maintenance on the sets. The mine is entitled to disconnect power generation to 
Siguiri town in emergencies to ensure that there is no disruption in production at its 
operations. 
 
Although this plan comes after protests, the merit of this plan between AngloAshanti and 
the local government is to articulate the responsibilities of both the company and the 
government, notably in terms of responsibility for operations and maintenance.   This latter 
responsibility is often not borne by the company, not planned for by the government and 





                                                 
22Rainbow Power Company, “Solar power for village homes,” available at: 
http://www.rpc.com.au/products/services/faq-info/lihirarticle23oct.html. 
23
 World Gold Council, “Sharing utilities: mines extend water and power to communities”, 2012, available at: 
http://www.goldfacts.org/en/society/utilities/. 
24
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3.2. Requiring the provision of local electricity supply under the concession agreement 
 
Another solution used by host countries to make sure that mining investments in electricity 
generation would benefit local communities has been to require mining companies to 
supply local electricity as a condition to the granting of the mining concession. In Liberia, 
for example, the government requires the mining company building a power plant to 
design excess capacity for neighboring communities (see box 3). 
 
Box 3: Liberia – Contractual Requirement to designing excess capacity for the 
community 
In Liberia, the government negotiated with the Putu project’s mining operator the 
following clause:  “the Power Plant shall be designed to generate a quantity of electric 
energy in excess of the electric energy required by the Company for Operations to supply 
third party users located within a 10 km radius thereof on a 7 days per week, 24 hours per 
days basis in accordance with third party user demand from time to time. The Company 
may charge residential users reasonable rates for their power usage based upon their 
ability to pay. The Company may charge businesses commercially reasonable rates for their 
power usage. The Company shall provide electric power free of charge to non-profit 
organizations and Government agencies.”25 
 
Moreover, section 19.3(d) requires the Power Plant to be designed and constructed in a 
way that allows expansion “on a commercially feasible basis to have twice the electricity 
generating capacity required to service Operations.” 
 
Developing model concession agreements mandating the provision of electricity within a 
certain radius would increase certainty for investors, as well as put all mining companies 
on an equal footing with regards to their corporate social responsibility programs.   
 
Those mandatory requirements should stem from a policy framework encouraging, 
targeting and planning around the decentralized energy generation of the mines. Indeed 
this decentralized energy can be an essential opportunity for the remote communities from 
the grid given its advantages: efficiency is improved at the facility level (capacity is tailored 
to the demand), losses on the transmission lines are reduced (given that higher voltages 
are hard to carry over long distances, a reduction in the haulage distance increases 
efficiency), smaller technologies such as renewable energies are easier to develop for 
logistic reasons.26 However without a policy framework, decentralized energy will not 
benefit the communities.  
 
In Papua New Guinea, mining companies call on the state to create a framework that would 
give an incentive to wider private participation. In particular, their criticism focuses on the 
lack of operating and maintenance budgets from the local governments, insufficient 
                                                 
25Mineral Development Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and Putu Iron Ore Mining, 
Inc., dated as of September 2, 2010. 
26
 Amory B. Lovins and Hunter L. Lovins, Brittle Power: Energy Security for National Security (Andover, 
Massachusetts: Brick House Publishing Company, 1982) pp. 223, 231, 232. 
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subsidies to end-users hampering the development of viable commercial markets, and the 
lack of “Community Service Obligation” (CSO) financing.27  
 
In addition, this policy framework should consider the question of sustainability of the 
investment beyond the closure of the mine: who is ensuring the maintenance of the 
system? What is the succession plan for the power infrastructure after the mine closes? 
Should the community pay for the electricity? and if so, at which reasonable charges?    
 
As part of the answers to those questions, the framework should consider whether the 
energy demand coming from the mine cannot and should not be leveraged to expand the 
grid to these remote areas to connect those islands of mine-based decentralized energy.  
 
 




Expanding the grid to connect the different mines raises a series of financial and technical 
challenges that are specific to each country and case. The overall costs depend both on the 
load of power that each connected mine needs and the distance: the greater the power 
needs of the mine and the shorter the distance, the lower the levelized unit cost of power 
transmission.  
 
In Liberia, for example, connecting concessions and their power generation assets to the 
grid would be economically effective for only some of them (see box 4). 
 
Box 4: Liberia – Expanding the grid is not economically rational for all concessions 
In Liberia, for example, a World Bank report estimates that annual iron ore production 
requires 10 to 20 MW/million tons. As for gold, a small to -medium sized mine consumes 
30 to 50 MW/million tons annually. Under this scenario, the levelized unit cost (LCOE)28 of 
power transmission according to the report, is less than half a dollar cent per kilowatt-hour 
for an iron ore mine and less than one dollar cent per kilowatt-hour for a gold mine.29  
Because of the small differentials in power generation costs between grid power and 
power produced at mines, it would be cost-effective to expand the national grid and 
incorporate mining projects. The grid expansion would allow the mines to either buy from 
the grid or sell to the grid.  
On the other hand, because agriculture and forestry concessions demand much less 
electricity (1 MW per concession maximum), connecting those operations to the grid would 
                                                 
27Asian Development Bank, Town Electrification Investment Program, Sector Assessment (Summary): Energy, 
available at http://www2.adb.org/Documents/RRPs/PNG/41504/41504-01-png-ssa.pdf. 
28Levelized costs represent the present value of the total cost of building and operating a generating plant over its 
financial life, converted to equal annual payments and amortized over expected annual generation from an assumed 
duty cycle  
29Those assumptions, however, are very case sensitive and the study assumptions were that for an iron ore mine, 
power demand would be 100 MW and for a gold mine, it would be 30 MW.  
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be uneconomical in most cases and powering them through their own-power based on 
biomass residuals would be a more cost-effective solution. 30 
Financing the grid expansion 
Connecting mines’ own-site generation to the grid is also beneficial for the mine. The 
advantage lies in the increase in reliability and elimination of the need to buy energy 
storage, since the excess electricity can be sold back to the grid. Therefore the question is 
who is financing the grid expansion?  It will depend on the arrangements with the public 
utility but as a general rule, financing the grid expansion often relies on state participation, 
especially when it comes to connecting remote areas. Public participation is particularly 
justified in a context where the infrastructure is used by the public. In Quebec, where the 
strategy is to leverage mining companies’ presence to expand the grid to remote Nunavik, 
the participation of the provincial government depends on the “value of the benefit granted 
and the level of risk involved” (see box 5).  
 
Box 5: Quebec – Equity interest in exchange of infrastructure 
Quebec government hopes to extend the transmission grid to Nunavik to supply mining 
operations in the territory. The extension of the electrical grid toward Nunavik will seek to 
fulfill a number of objectives: the provision of power to mining operations across the 
territory; the connection of various Nunavik communities to Hydro-Québec’s main 
electrical grid, which will replace current electrical production generated by local thermal 
power facilities with clean, renewable hydropower; and the integration of future 
hydroelectric installations in Nunavik. 31 
 
In Quebec province, mining companies are responsible for the provision of their own 
infrastructure where access to existing networks or grids is limited. However, while public 
infrastructure projects may help lure mining investments in northern Quebec, the 
provincial government will determine the government’s participation in infrastructure 
development along common good and shared use criteria.32  The size of the government 
interest “will depend on the value of the benefit granted and the level of risk involved.”33 
Quebec has already notified thirteen developers of its government’s interest in taking a 
stake in their projects.34  
 
Financing the grid expansion is a very expensive undertaking for a country and the 
challenge is often to earmark enough revenues for it.  In Brazil, wire charges(i.e. fees paid 
to access transmission lines, levied on generators) feed public benefits funds, which then 
invest in energy efficiency, renewable energy, energy-related research and development, as 
                                                 
30
 World Bank, “Leveraging investments by natural resource concessionaires,” 2011, op.cit 
31
 Frederic Tomesco, “Quebec Aims to Boost Mining With Infrastructure in Budget,” Bloomberg News, March 21, 
2012, available at:  http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-20/quebec-aims-to-boost-mining-with-
infrastructure-in-budget. 
32




 Tomerco, “Quebec aims to boost mining with infrastructure in budget,” 2012, op. cit. 
34
 Québec and Its Natural Resources, Finances Québec, Budget 2012-2013, available at: 
http://www.budget.finances.gouv.qc.ca/Budget/2012-2013/en/documents/resources.pdf. 
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well as assistance to low-income customers in electricity provision.35 The example of Brazil 
provides an additional way to leverage the mining generation:  wire charges could be 
collected from the mines when they connect to the grid. As seen further in Section 4, those 




4. SITUATION TWO: THERE IS A GRID AND SOURCING FROM THE GRID IS MORE EXPENSIVE THAN OWN-
GENERATION 
 
In the situation where the electricity provided by the grid is more expensive than own 
generation, mining companies have a clear incentive to invest in their own power 
generation. Therefore, the challenge for host countries is to develop incentives for the 
mining industry to build additional generation capacity and increase domestic supply to 
the grid, which would help reduce the cost of the grid electricity in return. 
 
In the context of difficult geopolitics, increasing domestic supply is particularly encouraged. 
In the case of Mongolia, for example, mining companies invest in own-built generation 
because the government is searching to gain independence from the neighbors (see box 6).  
 
Box 6: Mongolia – Avoiding foreign dependence 
The Oyu Tolgoi mining project, a joint venture between the Government of Mongolia, 
Ivanhoe Mines, and Rio Tinto, will start commercial operations in 2013. It will produce 
450,000 tons of copper and 330,000 ounces of gold per year. It needs 600 MW for its 
operations at peak production.36 For now, diesel generators provide the necessary energy, 
but Oyu Tolgoi LLC has been allowed by the government of Mongolia to build a 600 MW 
dedicated coal-fired power plant. 37 
 
The project developers had also planned to build a 220 kV 170km transmission line 
through the desert to connect the project to the Chinese grid and sign an additional power 
purchase agreement with the governments of China and Mongolia to allow Chinese 
electrical power to be imported into Mongolia.38 But this project has raised concerns from 
the government of Mongolia for two reasons. First, the government does not want to rely 
solely on one source of power, and wants to develop and control its own generation 
capacity. Second, receiving electricity from China would mean higher costs of electricity 
supply than local power plants.39As a result, it has been agreed that the transmission line to 
China will be considered as a “stop-gap measure.” In addition, the government of Mongolia 
                                                 
35
 See Brazil Law No. 10848 of 2004. See also Gilberto de Martino Jannuzi and Alan Poole, “Public benefit funds 
are not enough to secure energy efficiency and energy R&D activities: Lessons from Brazil,” available at:  
http://www.fem.unicamp.br/~jannuzzi/documents/1692006ACEEE.pdf. 
36MIT Sloan Management, “Oyu Tolgoi: Challenges” Natural Resources Study Tour: Mongolia & China, April 6, 
2012, available at: http://mitsloanblog.typepad.com/natural_resources/2012/04/oyu-tolgoi-challenges.html. 
37Alex MacDonald, “Ivanhoe to build Oyu Tolgoi power plant by 2017,” Market Watch, December 9, 2011 available at: 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ivanhoe-to-build-oyu-tolgoi-power-plant-by-2017-2011-12-09. 
38Ivanhoe Mines “Ivanhoe Mines announces 2011 financial results and review of operations – Oyu Tolgoi copper-
gold-silver project on track to start initial production in third quarter of 2012,” 2012, op. cit.  
39The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Southern Mongolia Infrastructure 
Strategy (Washington D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, 2009), 
available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMONGOLIA/Resources/SMIS_July.pdf. 
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foresees that any private line which connects to the Central Electric System and which is of 
or above 220 kV must be state-owned. 40 Moreover, Oyu Tolgoi mining contract even 
foresees that all the electric power must be sourced from within Mongolia after four years 
of mine life.41  
 
Those private initiatives occur in a context where the government is focused on the 
development of a Programme for an Integrated Power Energy System. Its goal is to extend 
the power supply to all the country’s areas, build additional power projects under 
PPP/BOT agreements, reduces exports and increases its power independency from its 
neighbors China and Russia.42   
 
In Chile, similarly, the government seeks independence from its neighbors after Argentina 
started, in 2004, to substantively reduce natural gas exports to energy – poor Chile.  
But interestingly as opposed to Mongolia, instead of requiring investment in own-




As we saw in Section 2.1, mining companies can benefit from a gain in marginal cost if extra 
capacity is built. Yet even if the marginal capital costs are lower, an appropriate legal 
and regulatory regime is needed to encourage the mining investment in power 
generation beyond their own needs. 
 
 
4.1. Developing the appropriate regulatory framework 
 
4.1.1. Need for a power sector reform? 
To induce more investment in additional generation, most emerging and developed 
countries have gone through a power sector reform since the 1980’s (starting with Chile) 
to unbundle the natural monopoly activities (transmission, distribution) from the 
competitive ones (generation, trading, supply) as well create a competitive wholesale and/ 
or retail market43. The principal features of this standard model of reform are “1) stand-
alone transmission company, 2) privately-owned, competing generation companies that 
bid into a bulk/wholesale power pool, 3) supply competition for all or part of the retail 
market, 4) third-party access to transmission and distribution on non-discriminatory, 
transparent terms, 5) independent and transparent regulator”.44 
 
Realizing the insufficiency of public funds for new generation as well as the poor 
performance of the state-owned utilities, Sub-Saharan Africa has also gradually followed 
the trend of power sector reform and according to the World Bank Africa Infrastructure 
                                                 
40Oxford Business Group, The Report: Mongolia 2012 (2012), p. 117. 
41Peter Ker, “Rio Tinto in Mongolian power struggle,” Brisbane Times, March 21, 2012 available at: 
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/business/rio-tinto-in-mongolian-power-struggle-20120321-1vj1f.html. 
42
 IBRD/World Bank, 2009, op. cit. 
43
 A wholesale market is a market where a generator does not sell directly to the end-users, but to public and/or 
private retailers, including, for example, transmission and distribution companies.  
44
 Hunt, S. (2002). Making competition work in electricity. New York, Wiley 
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Country Diagnostic (AICD) covering 24 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, all those countries 
besides a few exceptions enacted a power sector reform law: “ three-quarters introduced 
some form of private participation in power; two-thirds corporatized their state-owned 
power utilities; a similar number established some kind of regulatory oversight body; and 
more than a third have independent power producers in operation.”45 However the impact 
of the reform has remained limited and the general model is a hybrid model whereby the 
national state-owned utility, still vertically integrated, holds a dominant market position, 
by imposing a single buyer requirement and keeping its own generation plants (this 
situation is now contested by mining companies in South Africa – (see box 13 )). The 
private participation though limited however exists, notably in the form of Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs).  While waiting for the power sector reform to be furthered 
beyond the hybrid model46, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa can still create 
regulatory incentives to leverage the electricity demand of the mines and encourage 
companies to generate extra capacity to be sold back to the grid: those incentives 
include strong IPP and PPA legislations as well as an independent regulator 
mechanism regulating tariffs and access charges to ensure IPPs’ power sales happen 
on equal terms with existing generators.    
 
 
4.1.2. Developing IPP legislation licensing generators to sell to the grid 
An IPP is an entity, which is not a public utility, but which owns facilities to generate 
electricity for sale to utilities and sometimes end users. Developing an IPP legislation is 
therefore necessary when the public utility cannot afford investments in additional power 
generation and transmission, and when the mining investments in power generation can 
supplement the public utility’s investments. South Africa and its public utility Eskom are in 
the throes of this reform (see box 7). 
 
Box 7: South Africa – Endeavors to increase private participation in the power sector 
Although Eskom, the State-owned power utility, does not have exclusive generation rights 
in South Africa, it generates approximately 95% of the electricity used47 and maintains the 
national grid. In 2009, IPPs generated less than 2% of the electricity produced in South 
Africa.48 Prior to the 2008 electricity crisis, self-provision was seen to be prohibitively 
expensive and risky, but that is changing because of a better local understanding of the 
available technologies, a substantive increase in Eskom tariffs and a deterioration of 
electricity supply by Eskom.  The government has implemented reforms to facilitate 
investments by IPPs. Eskom has been suffering from severe financial losses and can’t afford 
                                                 
45Anton Eberhard, Vivien Foster, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, Fatimata Ouedraogo, Daniel Camos, and Maria 
Shkaratan,  The State of the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, May 2008, Africa Infrastructure Country 
Diagnostic, Background Paper 6, World Bank 
46
 Note, that in its report in 2003, the World Bank recognizes that the standard model of power sector reform is not 
necessarily applicable to developing countries after championing it for years. See WB (2003). Private Sector 
Development in the Electric Power Sector: A Joint OED/OEG/OEU Review of the World Bank Group's Assistance 
in the 1990s. Washington, D.C., World Bank.  
47
“Company announcement: Coal supply agreement executed with Eskom,” Mining Weekly, March 6, 2012, 
available at: http://www.miningweekly.com/article/company-announcement-coal-supply-agreement-executed-with-
eskom-2012-03-06. 
48Reegle, “Energy profile South Africa,” op. cit. 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
IN  THE C ITY  O F NE W YOR K  
   
generation investments any longer. A law has been passed in Electricity Regulation Act No. 
4 of 2006 (the Act)49 and under the pressure of the mining sector and of the energy 
industry more generally, a new law is being discussed to improve market conditions for 
private participants (see box 13). 
 
Before developing IPP legislations, some countries such as India have developed the 
Captive Power Plant (CPP) status for those entities willing to generate power for their own 
needs, but with no intention to sell to the grid. India provides for an interesting illustration 
(see boxes 8, 9 and 17) of a country that faced with systematic power shortages, under-
capacity of the national power network and limited impact of the reform of the power 
sector50 decided to leverage companies’ own generation. For this reason the Indian 
government has progressively changed the CPP legislation to allow CPPs to sell to the grid 
and operate as IPPs (see box 8).  
 
Box 8: India – The regulatory framework and economics of CPPs  
The Central Government has supported the development of an independent power 
generation industry under its National Electricity Policy of 200351 and has subsequently 
progressively lifted the licensing requirement for electricity generation52. In addition in 
2008, the National Electricity Act of 2003 was altered to authorize the sale of electricity at 
the Indian Energy Exchange (IEX), through which CPPs can sell to both companies and 
State Electricity Boards. The idea was to create a platform for the quick sale of electricity to 
users that would be faced with shortages of power53.  
 
In this regulatory context, the economics of CPP happens to be more favorable compared to 
that of traditional grid generators for three reasons. First, CPPs may be able to pass on 
increased feedstock costs to consumers via the end product being manufactured by the 
parent plant,54 whereas traditional generators generally have to absorb any increase in 
feedstock costs. Second, Indian CPPs have been able to sell on a spot basis, taking 
advantage of power shortages. Third, Indian CPPs generally employ cogeneration (using 
the waste heat from industrial processes such as cement manufacturing), which increases 
the efficiency and lowers the marginal cost of power production. Since CPP power costs can 
be half that of grid generators, many companies prefer buying electricity from CPPs rather 
                                                 




 Hansen identified factors for a successful standard power sector reform and noticed that they haven’t been fully 
present in India: functioning transmission grid with adequate capacity and regular maintenance regime, high 
regulatory capacity, robust legal system and enforceable contracts, robust distribution companies, both physically 
and financially, slow demand growth, restriction imposed on the monopoly power of the incumbent. See: 
Christopher Hansen, “Bottom Up Electricity Reform Using Captive Generation: A Case Study of Gujarat, India”, 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, March 2008 
51Government of India, Electricity Act of 2003, available at: 
http://www.powermin.nic.in/acts_notification/electricity_act2003/pdf/The%20Electricity%20Act_2003.pdf 
52
 See Electricity (Amendment) Act of 2007, available at 
http://www.powermin.nic.in/acts_notification/electricity_act2003/pdf/Electricity_Act_2007.pdf 
53
 “Power to the captives”, Forbes India, October 27, 2009, http://forbesindia.com/article/breakpoint/power-to-the-
captives/6102/1 
54
“Fuel crisis hinders ambitions of captive power,” Business Standard, February 14, 2012. 
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than electricity from the public grid, which is more expensive.55 In addition the 2010 Indian 
regulation56 allows a renewable energy supplier to sell to a distribution licensee at a price 
to be fixed at the “pooled cost of power purchase”, meaning the weighted average price of 
electricity generation (including cost of self-generation) that the distributor has purchased 
from all energy sources to the exclusion of renewable energy sources (which includes co-
generation): the generator can therefore keep the profit margin if renewable energy is 
cheaper to produce than the average. 
 
For these reasons, some Indian CPP operators have reported large profits. For example, 
Jindal Power (a subsidiary of Jindal Power and Steel) almost sells half of the electricity 
produced in its CPPs.57 Jindal Power plans to add another 2,400MW of generating capacity 
to its existing plant. Essar Group, currently uses 85% of its 1,600MW power for captive 
purposes (steelworks and refining operations), and sells 300MW to the state electricity 
authority pursuant to a 20 year power purchase agreement, based on a 13% return on 
equity. Any increase in fuel or other costs is passed on to the customer. Essar Group has 
announced plans for a 10,000MW expansion plan mainly focused on non-captive off-take 
that would reduce captive use to just 20%.58 
 
Regardless of the distinction between IPP and CPP, one of the key elements lies is in the 
regulation of licensing, be it for the development of the generation facility or for electricity 
trade. The regulations applicable to licensing, the nature of the licensing 
administration and the speed of its process will more or less create market 
incentives for the firms to invest in additional generation. The process can also be 
simplified by forgoing the licensing requirement for the generation stage, as it is the case in 
India, although Indian authorities still require a license for interstate electricity trading59 
and the CPP operator still needs to comply with a series of technical requirements to 
ensure the quality of the electricity supplied. 
 
 
4.1.3. Developing Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) legislation  
Where capacity expansion is required, the investment costs must be recoverable and 
revenue streams sufficiently definite into the future to enable the owner to obtain financing 
on reasonable terms. Therefore, regulations may allow providers and customers to enter 
into long-term contracts whereby the customers (the utility or other users) commit to 
buying a minimum amount of capacity from the owner over a longer period. This is 
generally preferred by infrastructure service providers as it provides more certainty and is 
usually necessary to obtain financing for the investment required. Therefore developing 
the appropriate framework for such contracts that are called Power Purchase Agreement 
(PPA) in the power sector is a key factor to ensure the participation of mining companies in 
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“Power to the captives”, op.cit 
56
 Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for recognition and issuance of Renewable 
Energy Certificate for Renewable Energy Generation) Regulations, 2010, available at: 
http://cercind.gov.in/Regulations/CERC_Regulation_on_Renewable_Energy_Certificates_REC.pdf. 
57
” Fuel crisis hinders ambitions of captive power”, Business Standard, February 2012, “http://www.business-
standard.com/india/news/fuel-crisis-hinders-ambitionscaptive-power/464604/” 
58
“Power to the captives”, op. cit. 
59Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Procedure, Terms and Conditions for grant of trading licence and 
other related matters) Regulations, 2008, No. L-7/143/158/2008-CERC. 
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electricity generation.  In addition to indicating who would buy the power, “a strong PPA 
details quantity and cost of power bought, dispatching of plants, fuel metering, 
interconnection, insurance, force majeure, transfer, termination, change of 
legal provisions, refinancing arrangements and dispute resolution mechanisms”. 60 
 
A first type of PPA arrangement is signed between the mining company, as electricity 
generator and seller, and its purchaser. As an increasing number of mining companies 
decide to vertically integrate with power operations, this arrangement is more and more 
common in the mining industry. Firstly, the purchaser under the PPA can be the public 
entity as a single buyer, this is the case in most of the countries in Africa. Secondly, if the 
system is structured as a wholesale market, the PPA can be signed with the entities owning 
the distribution lines.  
 
In markets that went through further reforms and that are qualified as being retailed 
markets, the PPA can also be signed directly between the mining company and a large-scale 
user, either another large-scale industrial entity or a group of customers that offers 
guarantees of sufficient financial capacity as well as demand stability to constitute a 
profitable client under the PPA. When the utility’s financial capacity is limited or not 
creditworthy and the generator can count on the presence of large customers, the 
absence of single-buyer requirement is usually an incentive for mining companies to 
invest in extra-capacity. The challenge of this arrangement is that generators would 
“capture” large-scale end-users, thus leaving the public utility with low-income customers, 
and therefore lower revenues as in the case in India (see box 9).   
 
Box 9: India – Discrimination against CPPs to save the business model of the utilities  
India’s CPPs are facing problems. Firstly, local governments are quite resistant, as there 
have strong vested interests in their state-owned generating and distribution companies; 
some state policies even discriminate against captive power plants by levying various 
charges (such as charges for grid support, high sales tax, etc.) that discourage market entry 
and distort the market in favour of the incumbent. Secondly, regulators in certain states are 
beginning to clamp down on CPPs, fearing that too great of a migration of industrial 
customers away from grid generators toward CPPs will damage the Indian cross-
subsidization model, whereby industrial customers pay a higher tariff to subsidize 
residential and agricultural customers. For example, in the Maharashtra state, the 
government plans to raise the maximum electricity duty charged on CPP owners (including 
alternative energy producers) by four times, as well as the duty charged on electricity 
produced by CPPs to third-parties.61 The idea is to hamper the development of CPPs, 
because if industrial users all use power generated by CPPs, the public electricity provider 
will not have any customers but below-poverty line end-users and farmers. Finally, the 
Indian state of Gujarat elected to charge CPPs a fee for using the distribution network, and 
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made them provide in-kind compensation for transmission losses; for example, to sell 
1MWh to a customer, the CPPs had to provide 1.11MWh into the grid.62 This has made CPP 
economics difficult and given no incentive to the distribution company to reduce losses.  
 
A second type of PPA arrangement is signed between the mining company, as a 
purchaser and a seller, a third-party electricity generator that can provide both power 
and ancillary services (e.g. transmission system monitoring, voltage control, scheduling and 
dispatch, metering and billing, etc.). In jurisdictions where this status exists, this third party 
generator will be an IPP. Three reasons explain why a mining company would contract 
with a third party:  
- the third party provides cheaper electricity than the public provider,  
- the public provider does not provide sufficient electricity,  
- the mining company decides that electric generation is not part of its business model.  
 
Under this model, the IPP bears the risks and obligations associated with ownership, 
including commercial risks and maintenance obligations (see box 10). The mining company 
can have an equity stake in this IPP to keep some control over the development and 
management of the generation facilities.   
Under this model, the mining industry serves as anchor customers for third-party 
investments in power generation. (See also the example of Zambia in box 18.) 
 
Box 10: South Africa – Anglo American and its IPP 
To power its platinum mine that requires a secure power supply for continuing operations 
as well as future expansion, Anglo American is seeking to sign for a 450 MW coal-fired 
power project with an IPP in Emalahleni municipality, South Africa. It is a build-operate-
and-own project planned to start commercial operations in 2015. This project “navigate[s] 
the relatively uncharted territory related to third-party use of the transmission and 
distribution system”. 63 
 
Tasks among the different parties are allocated as follows: 
(1) Role of Anglo American. Anglo American provides the land, the coal (the developer 
will have access to the discard dumps of Anglo American Thermal Coal),64 and the water 
(coming from Anglo American’s Emalahleni Water Reclamation Plant from BHP Billiton’s 
closed South Witbank mine). Anglo American is also the loan facilitator, in charge of 
securing financing through international loans (Capex US$ 1 billion).65 
 (2) Role of IPP. Anglo American plans to sign a Coal Supply Agreement and a 25-year 
Power Purchase Agreement with the IPP to buy its entire capacity. In addition, Anglo 
American will sign Supplementary Supply Agreements with Eskom to use the electricity 
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 Hansen, “Bottom Up Electricity Reform Using Captive Generation: A Case Study of Gujarat, India”, March 2008, 
op.cit 
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produced at the IPP plant for the mining operations.66 In parallel, the IPP signed 
Connection, Transmission, Use of System and Operating Agreements with Eskom to allow 
the IPP to sell its electricity to Eskom, and an agreement was also signed between Anglo 
American and Eskom in order for Anglo American to off-take power from a substation to be 
built by Eskom.67 
(3) Role of the public electricity provider. Under the government’s electricity strategy 
laid out in its Integrated Resource Plan,68 Eskom is in charge of determining the terms of 
the connection agreements, the timing of the infrastructure, the use of System costs (Anglo 
American criticizes this legal framework and judges that the costs are too high by 
international standards, and that there is insufficient support to guarantee a fair allocation 
of costs.) 
(4) Role of other public agencies. The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (Nersa) 
and the Department of Energy provide support to facilitate the contractual arrangements 
for third-party use (regulatory framework, appropriate pricing, timing of connection), and 
they must approve them. 
Interestingly, Anglo American states that some of the project’s goals, in addition to serving 
for self-generation, include the need to contribute to local development, i.e. community 
needs, skills transfer, the development of secondary industries, as well as the provision of 
affordable electricity services “at no additional cost” to Eskom, the National Treasury or the 
consumers of South Africa, and to regional development.69  
 
In the case of Exxaro, this is the mining company itself that engages in the business of 
either third party generator or facilitator given the high expected proceeds and the opening 
of the power market in South Africa. For this purpose Exxaro created the subsidiary Exxaro 
Energy (see box 11).   
 
Box 11: Exxaro – The development of an energy business for third-parties 
Exxaro Energy owns and operates the power generation on behalf of hosts, which then buy 
Exxaro’s electricity under a PPA.  
Two of the strategic branches of Exxaro Energy are Exxaro Onsite and Exxaro IPPs. 
- Exxaro On Site is a joint venture between Exxaro (51%) and Prana Energy (49%), a 
developer of clean power-generation facilities. 9 projects are forecast from 1012 to 
2018 for total capacity of 400 to 600 MW. Exxaro On Site does project management, 
feasibility, securing of funding and construction, and then sell the power back to the 
host companies. 70 
- Exxaro IPPs does not hold equity in the IPPs and does not finance them, but facilitates 
their creation so that Exxaro can sell coal to them and then secure for them the offtake 
agreements as well as obtain access to the grid on the basis of Eskom's generation being 
unbundled from the transmission entities as is envisaged by the reform (see box 13).71  
                                                 
66Hall, “Khanyisa Project,” 2010, op. cit. 
67Creamer, “Questions stream in ahead of Anglo American thermal coal’s IPP deadline,” 2011, op. cit. 
68Integrated Resource Plan 2010, Draft Rev. 2 Report, p. 22 – IRP Projects, paragraph 3 (section 6.a.) 
69Hall, “Khanyisa Project,” 2010, op. cit. 
70Martin Creamer, “Exxaro expects to wheel electricity from four coal IPPs,” Mining Weekly, July2, 2010, available 
at: http://www.miningweekly.com/article/exxaro-expects-to-wheel-power-to-customers-from-four-coal-ipps-2010-
06-21. 
71Martin Creamer, “Exxaro expects to wheel electricity from four coal IPPs,” 2010, op. cit. 
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4.1.4. Setting up an independent regulator 
Given that the public utility is a state-owned entity engaged in commercial activity, it is 
uniformly recognized that private participation in the power sector necessitates an 
independent regulator. In order to encourage the mining industry participation in the 
power market, this independent regulator will have the following mandates: 
 
Mitigating risk 
Where the seller under the PPA is an IPP that must invest in sufficient generation capacity, 
the regulator must be capable of assessing risks. Risks, for example, include delays in 
payment, which will increase capital costs and therefore electricity prices. Risk mitigation 
is particularly necessary in the situation where there is a non-viable state-owned single 
buyer with whom, in Africa, the PPA is typically signed. As a result, most IPPs accept PPAs 
only with utilities with sovereign guarantees, such as escrow accounts, currency 
conversion, repatriation of profits, guarantees against nationalization and expropriation, 
and political risk insurance offered by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank.  
 
Regulating the tariff charged by the PPAs.  
The regulation of tariffs charged by the mining company selling under the PPA is necessary 
whatever the structure of the power market (vertically integrated with private 
participation, wholesale market or retail markets).  
 
This might be considered as a price capping process for the mining companies selling 
electricity, but it also ensures the viability of the market. It is to be noted for instance that 
the cost of bulk power supply is generally 50 to 70% of the distributor’s total supply 
costs.72 Therefore, captive customers supplied by a distributor who is the purchaser in the 
PPA must be guaranteed that the price at which the distributor will buy the electricity will 
not be too high. In addition in Sub-Saharan Africa where 28 IPPs have been counted as of 
2008, the price charged by the IPP under a PPA ranges from US$ 0.04/kWh to 0.40/kWh73, 
with the upper bound being often unaffordable for Sub-Saharan Africa public utilities.   
 
One possibility is to cap PPA tariffs, like in the state of Andra Pradesh in India where the 
capped price is based on benchmarking specific parameters of the power generation 
process74 but this method requires a micro-level regulation that may be too costly for 
regulators. The alternative is an overall benchmarking method, as used in Nigeria.  
 
                                                 
72
 John Besant-Jones, Bernard Tenenbaum and Prasad Tallapragada, “Regulatory review of power purchase 
agreements: A proposed benchmarking methodology” (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development/ The World Bank Group, 2008), available at:  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRREGTOPENERGY/Resources/717305-1266613906108/ESMAP_337-
08_Regulatory.pdf. 
73Besant-Jones, Tenenbaum and Tallapragada, “Regulatory review of power purchase agreements: A proposed 
benchmarking methodology,” 2008, op. cit. 
74Besant-Jones, Tenenbaum and Tallapragada, “Regulatory review of power purchase agreements: A proposed 
benchmarking methodology,” 2008, op. cit. 
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With the capping process, the challenge for the regulator is to avoid artificially fixing low 
prices, since this would prevent distributors from finding willing suppliers and hamper the 
long-term development of the electricity supply. A solution is to have a softer system where 
the regulator does not fix artificial prices, but reviews the prices that have been fixed by the 
parties, and issues comments on their reasonableness. See the case of Nigeria in box 12.  
 
Box 12: Nigeria – A soft regulatory framework, but focused on risk mitigation 
The primary role of the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) is to issue 
generation licenses and fix retail tariffs for electricity end-users.75 For this purpose, it 
reviews PPAs for which parties are free to set terms, ensuring that prices are not too high 
and that risks have been appropriately allocated. It also requires the purchaser to sign a 
declaration stating that it can afford its financial obligations under the contract. The 
justification is that the prices and terms fixed in the PPAs, if inappropriate, can have a 
negative impact on electricity prices paid by the public, even if end-users are not parties to 
the agreement. The parties to the agreement are not required to follow the comments of 
the NERC. But if they do not, they risk being forced to prices set by the NERC. Indeed, the 
NERC caps the price at which distribution companies can sell to their captive customers 
under the NERC’s planned multiyear tariff setting mechanism. As distribution companies 
themselves need to comply with this capped price fixed by the NERC, they cannot afford 
buying from generators at unreasonably high prices.  
 
There are two exceptions to this review procedure. The NERC will not review the PPA 
where the customers of the purchaser under the PPA are not captive, i.e. where they have 
alternative sources of electricity. In addition, the NERC will not perform a risk assessment 
for suppliers generating a capacity of under 100 MW, but it will still request information on 
prices in order to assess potential impacts on general market prices. 
 
The NERC is currently being asked to adopt more specific criteria to assess the fairness of 
tariffs. Those criteria could be based either on the “distributor’s current average cost of 
power”, on a “percentage of the current end-user tariff,” on a “percentage of the utility’s 
total costs,” or on the “percentage of the utility’s total power distributed that would come 
from the new PPA”.76 
 
Across the world, PPA regulation is conducted differently with various levels of efficiency. 
The following table gives an overview of the possible ways to regulate PPAs in terms of 
conduct or performance.  
 
Possible approaches to regulatory review of power purchase costs 





Assist in negotiating PPAs Lengthen the negotiation 
process 
Kenya (Second wave of IPPs) 
Ex-ante PPA review Reduce the need for 
regulatory 
Andhra Pradesh (India) and 
United States (1980s and early 
                                                 
75
 Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, “Public Consultation on a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) 
for Review of PPAs to Supply Captive Customers” (Abuja: Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission, December 
2006). 
76
 Besant-Jones, Tenenbaum and Tallapragada, “Regulatory review of power purchase agreements: A proposed 
benchmarking methodology,” 2008, op. cit. 
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intervention during the 
term of the PPA 
1990s) and Panama 
Standardized/model PPA Reduce transaction costs, 
ensures better visibility 
but parties still need to  
set the contract price and 
duration 
Proposed in Pakistan and India  
Mandated competitive 
procurement guidelines77 
The efficiency of those 
guidelines depends on the 
independent monitor 
ensuring the compliance 
Proposed in Laos and Florida 
Independent 
procurement monitor 
Issue public reports 












a maximum price 
Finding the right level is 
generally not in the 
capacity of the regulator  
Chile: too low 
Pakistan: too high initially (did 
not benefit from competition) 
Nigeria: proposed as the 
generation component of the 
MYTO79 
Tie maximum price to 
competitive power sales 
Works if the regulator can 
assess the competition 
correctly 
Chile: maximum price in “nonfree” 
market can be no higher than 15% 
of “free” market price 
Benchmarking of overall 
power purchase costs of 
distribution companies 
Ensure objective pricing 
standards – works if there 
are multiple distribution 
companies – works if not a 
lengthy process 
Colombia and Netherlands;  
Benchmarking of 
individual PPAs 
Proposed in Nigeria (2006) 
Adapted from Besant-Jones, Tenenbaum and Tallapragada80 
 
 
Fees charged to access the network 
In addition, power sector regulations include regulations of tariffs charged to access the 
distribution and transmission systems (which include wheeling charges81 and stand-by 
fees82 charged for utility’s services).  
  
For independent generators to be incentivized to connect to the grid, they should be 
guaranteed non-discriminatory prices, in particular in a context where the utility (or if a 
private company owning the transmission lines also owns generation facilities) might be 
tempted to increase its prices for competitors, and favor electricity produced by its own 
                                                 
77
 Guidelines for Competitive Power Procurement issued for long-term power purchases by a single buyer or other 
entities such as distribution companies that are captive customers of the generation source. 
78
 In the Southeastern United States, competitive procurement used to be required, but the problem is that 
distributors would pass on their costs to their suppliers and favor their affiliates. This system is only efficient if a 
regulator independently monitor compliance with the guidelines for procurement. 
79
 Multi-Year Tariff Order: annually adjusted multiyear tariff that establishes the generation component 
of a maximum national retail price – applied in Nigeria. 
80Besant-Jones, Tenenbaum and Tallapragada, “Regulatory review of power purchase agreements: A proposed 
benchmarking methodology,” 2008, op. cit. 
81
 Wheeling charges are the rent paid to the owner of the transmission and/or distribution network for its use by third 
party. 
82
 Customers who receive their electricity from the grid are charged for their overall, continuous consumption. 
However, customers connected to the grid with onsite, non-emergency generation need additional services, such as 
system control, quality control, scheduling and un-scheduling of their connection to the system; they are therefore 
charged stand-by fees also called backup service fees. 
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generators. Eskom, the South African public utility has been criticized by mining companies 
for exercising this kind of discrimination (see box 13).  
 
Box 13:  South Africa – Mining companies are asking for the unbundling of Eskom 
The South Africa Electricity Regulation Act No. 4 of 2006 requires the generator to sells its 
electricity to Eskom, acting as “Single Buyer.” Mining companies have been pressuring the 
government to come up with laws that would be more favorable to independent 
production, without the single buyer requirement. Mining companies criticize the fact that 
they are required to sell their electricity to Eskom and that guarantee mechanisms are not 
set up to help them negotiate fair terms with Eskom for access to its electricity distribution 
network. To overcome this stumbling block, the plan is therefore to unbundle Eskom’s 
generation activities from the distribution network and put the latter in the hands of an 
independent agency, probably a state-owned entity. Eskom would then compete with other 
producers to sell their power to the independent agency at agreed tariffs and on an arm’s 
length basis.83 The Electricity Regulation Second Amendment Bill of December 19, 
201184has been developed to address this criticism but has not yet been passed as of 
September 2012. 
 
As said earlier the solution to the access issue and to the problem of the 
discriminatory price of interconnections in most electricity markets has been to 
unbundle and  create a whole sale market to guarantee arm’s length negotiations 
between distribution companies and private generators.  However, starting with an 
independent regulatory agency to oversee the system and resolve access and tariffs 
disputes (as described in box 14 for the case of Australia’ Northern Territory with its 
vertically integrated power utility) is already a fundamental step towards encouraging 
the participation of mining company’s own generation in the power market.  
 
Box 14: Australia – Mechanism to resolve access dispute85 
The Utilities Commissioner is in charge of the regulation of the transmission and 
distribution businesses of the vertically integrated Northern Territory’s power utility, the 
Power and Water Authority (PAWA). The regulation consists in conciliating and arranging 
arbitration in any access dispute, monitoring compliance with the Electricity Networks 
(Third Party Access) Code of the Northern Territory, registering access agreements and 
determining a revenue cap that will apply to the parties of the PPA. The revenue cap is set 
at a level allowing the electricity supplier to raise sufficient revenues to cover its operating 
costs, finance necessary new investment, and get a satisfying return on past investment. In 
addition, PAWA must produce a set of reference tariffs for standard network access 
services, which must then be approved by the Utilities Commissioner. Individual access 
charges are left to commercial negotiation but should remain within limits set by the 
annual revenue cap and subject to the reference tariffs. 
                                                 
83Claude Harding, “South African mines might start generating their own power,” How We Made It In Africa, 
February 3, 2012, available at: http://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/south-african-mines-might-start-generating-
their-own-power/14794/. 
84Government of South Africa, Electricity Regulation Second Amendment Bill of December 2011, available at: 
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/policies/ElectricityRegulationSecondAmendmentBill.pdf. 
85
 Adapted from Productivity Commission, Review of the National Access Regime, Report No. 17 (Canberra: 
Productivity Commission, 2001), available at: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/18173/access.pdf. 
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In Western Australia where the utility is also vertically integrated, the regulatory regime 
requires the utility to provide indicative access prices calculated so as to recover the 
capital costs of providing the transmission and distribution network, capital 
investment in new works and a reasonable rate of return. The regulatory regime 
also requires the utility  
to make spare capacity and new capacity available to newcomers on a “first come, first 
served” basis, “so long as such investment is commercially viable.” 
 
 
Planning for the supply and demand on the networks with IPPs 
Intimately attached to sound policy and regulatory frameworks are coherent power sector 
plans. Ideally those plans would include “setting a reliability standard for energy security; 
completion of detailed supply and demand forecasts; a least-cost plan with alternative 
scenarios; and clarifying how new generation production will be split between the private 
and public sectors as well as the requisite bidding and procurement processes for new 
builds”.86 Those plans would allow the regulation of the quantity and quality of electricity 
on the network in the short term and long term.  
 
Indeed, with the new connections from the mining’s own generators comes the challenge of 
regulating the supply and demand of electricity. Where too little or too much energy in the 
network create dysfunctions in the power supply, it is essential to have a regulator to 
control volume on the network and order generators to either connect or disconnect, 
depending on the needs of the network, with sufficient notice.  The regulator must find 
back-up supply in the case of shortages. In the case of expected surpluses, the regulator 
must order generators to engage in rerouting, load alterations, shedding (cutting off loads).  
 
The regulator could resort to access charges to regulate the quality of the system. If the 
access charges are based on small duration availability rather than differentiating between 
peak and off-peak times, it will encourage generators to undertake internal demand 
management to reschedule production (where possible) to lower cost times, which in 
aggregate smooth power consumption, reducing power prices in peak times and closing 
supply gaps87. 
 
Summary: Policy and regulatory framework necessary to encourage the contribution of 




Stable macroeconomic policies 
Legal system allows contracts to be enforced, laws to be upheld, arbitration 
Good repayment record and investment grade rating (for the public utility) 
Requires less (costly) risk-mitigation techniques to be employed which translates 
into lower cost of capital and hence lower project costs and more competitive prices 
Clear policy Framework enshrined in legislation 
                                                 
86
 Gratwick, “An Analysis of Independent Power Projects in Africa: Understanding Development and Investment 
Outcomes” 2008, op.cit 
87
 Hansen, “Bottom Up Electricity Reform Using Captive Generation: A Case Study of Gujarat, India”, March 2008, 
op.cit 
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Framework Framework clearly specifies market structure and roles and terms for private and 
public sector investments (generally for single buyer model, not, yet, wholesale 
competition in African context) 
Reform-minded ‘champions’, concerned with long run, lead and implement 
framework 
Clear, consistent 
and fair regulatory 
supervision 
 
Improves general performance of private and public sector assets 
Transparent and predictable licensing and tariff framework improves investor 
confidence 





Energy security standard in place; planning roles and functions clarified 
Vested with lead, appropriate (skilled, resourced and empowered) agency 
Takes into consideration hybrid market (public and private stakeholders and their 
respective real costs of capital) and fairly allocates new build opportunities among 
stakeholders 
Has built-in contingencies to avoid emergency power plants or blackouts 
          Source: Adapted from Gratwick, K. N., and A. Eberhard. 200888 
  
 
4.2 Encouraging group power plants  
It is often the case that, when the upfront costs are substantive, companies benefit from 
partnering because of the related economic gains in terms of risk sharing and economies of 
scale. The partnership takes the form of joint ownership with other companies (being 
generators, electricity users or equity providers) of either a specific power plant (the 
consortium model or the special purpose vehicle model – to further diminish the financial 
risk exposure of the owners) or a company owning a portfolio of energy-related projects 
(the joint venture model).  Having a local partner (private or state-owned) or a 
Development Finance Institution in those structures have been said to reduce the political 
risk.89  
 
Brazil (box 15) and Finland (box 16) present interesting examples of company partnership 
to finance massive hydro and nuclear plants.  
 
Box 15: Brazil – Joint - investments to face the energy crisis  
In 1999, the U$240mn Igarapava hydroelectric power plant in Brazil began full operations 
with a total capacity of 210MW. The power generation project is a private sector 
consortium of mining and power companies: Companhia Siderurgica Nacional (CSN) 
(17.9%), CVRD (Vale) (38.2%), Cia Mineira de Metais (23.9%), Minas Gerais integrated 
power company Cemig (14.5%) (former state-owned utility) and Mineração Morro Velho 
(5.5%). The project helped CSN, a Brazilian steel producer, gained an important 
competitive advantage with electricity costs around US$5/MW, whereas sourcing from 
Eletrobras, the Brazilian state-run utility had a cost of US$38/MW.90  
 
                                                 
88
 Gratwick, “An Analysis of Independent Power Projects in Africa: Understanding Development and Investment 
Outcomes” 2008, op.cit 
89
 Gratwick, “An Analysis of Independent Power Projects in Africa: Understanding Development and Investment 
Outcomes” 2008, op.cit 
90
“CSN open to offers for 7% Light stake,” Business News Americas, May 30, 2000, available at: 
http://www.bnamericas.com/news/electricpower/CSN_Open_to_Offers_for_7*_Light_Stake. 
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The energy crisis, in 2001, gave the mining sector a stronger incentive to invest in power 
generation. The aluminum industry was one of the most affected, accumulating losses of 
more than US$ 500 million by the end of 2002, due to energy rationing, reduced production 
and export losses.91  Mining companies, therefore, decided to increase joint investments to 
ensure power supply and increase gains from economies of scale. In 2001, a consortium of 
mining and steel mill industries won the 35-year Santa Isabel hydroelectric concession. The 
consortium, Gesai, includes the following members: Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (43.85%), 
Billiton Metais (20,60%), Alcoa (20%), Votorantim (10%) and Camargo Correia (5,55%). 
The power plant has an installed capacity of 1,087 MW and costs approximately US$ 720 
million. 92 
 
In Finland, the Mankala structure is a Finnish financing structure under which several 
industrial customers pool their resources to finance their shares in a generating facility. 
This structure mitigates the electricity market risk, since the revenues of the generator are 
secured by long-term off-take agreements with its owners (see box 16).  
 
Box 16: Finland – The Mankala pooling structure  
Fennovoima is a Finnish company owning nuclear power plants generating more than 
2,500 MW. It has 68 shareholders, including the mining company Talvivaara Mining 
Company, which owns a share of 60 MW.93 Altogether, Fennovoima’s shareholders use 
more than one third of the national electricity consumption. Shareholders pay for the fixed 
and variable costs of generation in exchange for at-cost electricity and return rates 
according to their respective shares.94 
 
The second example is Tellisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO), structured as a non-profit 
organization. All the shareholders are jointly liable for TVO’s annual fixed costs, even in 
cases where electricity is not produced. Those costs amount to 80 to 85 % of the total costs 
and include debt installments and interest payments. In addition, shareholders also need to 
pay TVO’s variable costs according to the proportion of their off-take.95 But according to 
Standard and Poor’s, TVO suffers from high financial risk ratios and therefore proposes 
that TVO sell its surplus to the Nordic spot market “at a price above its full production 
cost.”96  
 
Through joint-projects, companies can, not only, scale up their contribution to the domestic 
power supply but also diminish the environmental footprint of the power project. In 
                                                 
91
“Mineradoras investem em autogeração,” Gazeta Mercantil, November 9, 2001, available at: 
http://www.fiec.org.br/acoes/energia/informacoes/bcoexperiencias/mineradoras.htm. 




 Fennovoima, Press Release, March 14, 2012, available at: http://www.fennovoima.com/en/press-
releases/current/changes-in-fennovoima-s-ownerships. 
94
 “Mankala makes a move,” Nei Magazine, October 27, 2009, available at: 
http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?sc=2054511. 
95
 Alf Stenqvist and Tania Tsoneva, “Finnish utility Teollisuuden Voima assigned ‘BBB/A-2’ ratings; Outlook 
stable” (Stockholm: Standard and Poor’s, 2012). 
96
 Stenqvist and Tsoneva, “Finnish utility Teollisuuden Voima assigned ‘BBB/A-2’ ratings; Outlook stable,” 2012, 
op. cit. 
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Liberia, for instance, the World Bank has assessed that a collective hydro-based solution 
over individual coal-fired plant could potentially save at least 22,000 tonnes of carbon 
dioxide emissions over the life of the mines.97  
 
Despite the business case for coordination between mining companies when it 
comes to investment in infrastructure, coordination doesn’t often happen because 
either companies perceive earlier access to power supply as a competitive advantage 
or because information asymmetry is not shared within clusters of power-intensive 
industry. This lack of coordination can generate a loss for the host country both in 
terms of unnecessary duplication of infrastructure as well as wasted scale 
economies.  Therefore there is a need for the government to create coordination 
mechanisms and encourage group power plants in mining areas.  
 
 
5. SITUATION THREE :  THERE IS A GRID AND SOURCING FROM THE GRID IS LESS EXPENSIVE THAN OWN 
GENERATION 
 
In a scenario where electricity provided by the grid is less expensive than self-
generated electricity, mines will all buy electricity from the grid. In this situation, 
there is a risk for the grid to reach capacity and become unreliable. The challenge is 
therefore to find mechanisms to increase generation and grid capacity and avoid 
unsteady electricity supply.  To be able to continue accessing cheap electricity, mines will 
generally work with utilities under various commercial arrangements to either sell 
distributed generation98 or create/ upgrade generation, transmission and distribution 
capacity to meet their demand. The challenge is to find the commercial framework to 
leverage the mining energy demand that generates cost savings for the mining industry and 




5.1 Compensating companies for using the idle capacity of their back up generators 
 
According to the World Bank, mining firms tend to build their own backup generating 
capacity regardless of the supply from the public grid, to ensure elevators, air pumps, and 
other safety devices remain fully operational at all times.99 Accordingly, this backup power 
capacity also represents a potential source of generating power if needed, although this 
supply is expensive. 
 
In India, steady increases in demand have outstripped the ability of the utilities to provide 
reliable power in many regions. At the same time, when they do not rely on co-generation 
as seen previously (box 8), companies have also developed their own diesel backup 
generating capacity to adapt to frequent interruptions of supply. As the supply shortage 
                                                 
97
 World Bank, “Leveraging investments by natural resource concessionaires,” 2011, op. cit 
98
 Distributed generation refers to own-site generation or decentralized energy as a source of electricity for the grid. 
99
 Vivien Foster and Jevgenijs Steinbuks, “Paying the price for unreliable power supplies: In-house generation of 
electricity by firms in Africa,” Working paper (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2008), p. 16. 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
IN  THE C ITY  O F NE W YOR K  
   
grew more severe, an innovative commercial model was adopted in the city of Pune to 
utilize companies’ backup generating capacity to cater to peak demand (see box 17). 
 
Box 17: Pune, India – Using unused back-up supply to power the neighborhoods100 
In 2006, the city of Pune in the state of Maharashtra was suffering from load shedding for 
two to three hours per day. There was an estimated shortfall of 90MW of generating 
capacity, whereas the top 30 industrial operators in Pune had unutilized captive capacity of 
100MW. In this context, the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) (more than 9,000 
different companies, including mining companies and energy producers) proposed to the 
Maharashatra Electricity Regulatory Commission that the operators utilize more of their 
idle capacity and less of the grid power to meet the shortfall.101 Of course, the industrial 
users wanted to be compensated for having to use more expensive captive power 
compared to cheaper grid power – the captive plants were mainly powered by liquid fuels 
such as diesel, which has a much higher variable cost than the grid. The CII proposed that 
industry be compensated for generating its own power by being paid the difference 
between the grid high-transmission tariff and its generating cost. The compensation costs 
were to be borne by consumers in Pune, in return for no load-shedding. The State regulator 
approved the model and set the “reliability charge” at Rs. 0.42/kWh to be levied on all 
consumers of more than 300 kWh/month within Pune Urban Circle, serving as an incentive 
to lower energy consumption. 
 
However, the Pune model ran into sustainability issues as the demand within Pune soon 
exceeded the captive capacity by 2008. The Maharashtra State distribution company 
ultimately franchised out the distribution and supply of electricity within Pune to Tata 
Power, which was tasked with generating 40MW of distributed energy and sourcing 
sufficient energy from elsewhere to meet the deficit in Pune.  
 
The success of this model relies on large captive capacity and on the willingness of 
consumers to pay for increased reliability. In addition, Pune-specific factors, such as low 
distribution losses (16.5% in Pune), high collection efficiency and a relatively high share of 
industrial and commercial consumption, have been critical for the success of the model 
since they’ve helped keep the reliability charges acceptable to beneficiaries. 102 This model 
is however a short-term solution in the sense that the supply remains limited to industrials’ 
idle capacity and can be quickly outstripped by growing demand. The long term solution 
goes beyond distributed generation and looks rather at creating and financing 
additional supply as well as improving energy efficiency. See further details below.  
 
 
5.2 The utility and mining companies share the financial burden of additional generation 
and transmission capacity  
                                                 
100
 Adapted from  IDFC, “Innovative partnership approach to mitigating load shedding: The ‘Pune Model’ and 
beyond”, Policy Group Quarterly, December 2008. 
101See In the Matter of Indian Industry (CII) Proposal to use Captive Power to mitigate load shedding in Pune 
Urban Circles of MSDECL, Case No. 29 of 2005, available at:  
http://www.mercindia.org.in/pdf/06_Order_dt_25_01_2006_CN_29%20of%202005.pdf. 
102
 IDFC, “Innovative partnership approach to mitigating load shedding: The ‘Pune Model’ and beyond”, 2008, 
op.cit 
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5.2.1 Mines pay back through utility bills or negotiate lower utility bills if they invest 
Most simply, the utility can finance the cost of additional generation, with repayment over 
time through tariffs from the customer, the mines. This is the case in the interesting case of 
Zambia (see box 18), where the utility supplying most of the mines of the copper belt is a 
private independent power transmission network. To attract investments, often electricity 
tariffs are subsidized for mines as it used to be the case in Zambia. It shouldn’t be the case 
as it endangers the financial capacity of the utility to pursue the necessary investments.  
 
Box 18: Zambia – Mines pays back for the investment in new hydro-power 
generation through higher tariffs 
In March 2012, Zambian independent power transmission group, Copperbelt Energy 
Corporation Plc, supplying power bought from Zesco, the public utility, to most of the 
mining operations on Zambia’s copperbelt, and the Nigeria financial institution Africa 
Finance Corporation (a hybrid investment bank and multilateral development financial 
Institution established by treaty amongst sovereign states) have signed a deal to finance 
the construction of two hydro-power projects in Zambia. Under this deal, projects that will 
be developed include the Kabompo Gorge Hydro Power Project in North-Western Zambia 
at a cost of US$150 million and the Luapula Hydro Schemes in Luapula Province at a cost of 
US$1 billion.  The Kabompo project is expected to bring development opportunities to the 
area and would also connect into the main Zambian electricity grid through a transmission 
line to the nearest ZESCO substation at Lumwana.103 The Luapala project is cross-border 
project with DRC. CEC signed a MoU with DRC’s public utility SNEL in April 2012 to 
cooperate in the feasibly study104. 
 
Electricity has been a major issue in Zambia with the copper industry growth being 
constrained by available electricity supply. State utility, Zesco, has resorted to rationing 
power to residents but according to CEC, these projects could help bring a power surplus of 
about 6000 MW by 2016.105  
 
However CEC warns that industrial electricity tariffs will need to increase by 20-30% per 
year to reach cost reflectivity and support new investments in generation106. Mines have 
been protected by a stabilization agreement between 2008 and 2011 stipulating that mines 
will not suffer from an increase in tariff during that period. In 2011, with the tariff 
stabilization ending, Zesco has increased by 30% its bulk supply tariff to CEC which has 
been approved by the independent regulator. Zesco and CEC need to negotiate a 5-year 
                                                 
103 Stanslous Ngosa, Zambia: Hydro Energy to Power North-Western Province, allAfrica.com, 30 May 2012,  
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framework for further tariff increase to reach cost reflective level for the bulk supply 
tariffs. 107 
 
In the U.S., mining companies and utilities work out different ways to build new 
transmission lines and substations to procure electricity to mining sites (see box 19). 
 
Box 19: United States – Sharing the financing of new distribution lines and 
substations 
In the U.S., mining companies generally source their electricity from the grid. The mining 
companies will generally assume a portion of the cost of constructing the connecting line 
from the closest utility line. For a connected load of up to about 1,000 horsepower, or about 
745,700 watts, it is known to be cheaper to let the utility provide a primary substation. For 
loads over 745,700 watts, constructing a private primary substation to transform incoming 
power to usage voltages may be more economical in exchange of more favorable rates.108 
 
 
5.2.2 Mines invest themselves in distribution networks and operate them  
When 1)sourcing power from the grid is not expensive, 2) the demand from the mine is 
substantial and 3) in addition the power market is vertically separated, there might be a 
business case for the mining customer to own and operate the distribution network, in 
addition to generation capacity, to ensure readily available electricity supply for the mine. 
This is the case of BHP and its Olympic Dam project in South Australia (see box 20). 
 
Box 20: South Australia – BHP Billiton financing and operating distribution lines  
BHP Billiton’s mine at Olympic Dam, South Australia, will be the largest uranium producer 
by 2020 and the largest open-cut copper mine in the world. BHP-Billiton owns and 
operates an AC network comprising a 275 kV transmission line, a 132 kV transmission line, 
associated substations and distribution works that supply its project.109 
 
BHP wants to expand the mine to process six times more minerals. With the planned 
developments, there would be additional electricity needs of 650 MW, i.e. 10% of South 
Australia’s base-load demand. In addition to building a gas fired power station and its 
related pipeline, one of the options that BHP is considering for electricity supply is 
financing a new 270 km 275 kV transmission line linking the project to Port Augusta, 
designed with spare capacity to meet the rising demand for electricity in the region, i.e. at 
Olympic Dam but also in the Roxby Down area. BHP plans to provide 50 MW to the copper 
mining company OZ Minerals for the development of its Prominent Hill mining project (130 
km away from Olympic Dam). 110 
 
                                                 
107
 Press Statement ERB Approves the ZESCO/CEC Application to Review Tariffs, 9th August 2011 
http://www.erb.org.zm/press/statements/CECTariffApproval2011.pdf 
108
 U.S. Department of Energy, “Energy and Environmental Profile of the U.S. Mining Industry” 2002, op.cit 
109
 Electricity Supply Industry Planning Council, Annual Planning Report, June 2007 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.esipc.sa.gov.au/ContentPages/43291790.pdf 
110




IN  THE C ITY  O F NE W YOR K  
   
This private participation in the power assets is an opportunity for the country but when 
the network relies on private financing, the challenge is in the implementation of third-
party access to existing transmission networks, while maintaining incentives for primary 
investors to build new networks if needed. Enforcement of third-party access requires an 
access regime as designed in Australia (see box 21) or as considered in the US (see box 22).  
 
Box 21: South Australia – Access regimes111 
Network operators participating in the national electricity market as in South 
Australia are required to comply with the access arrangements in the National 
Electricity Code (NEC). The code is jointly administered by the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the NEC administrator and State 
regulators: 
-The ACCC is responsible for assessing applications for changes to the access 
provisions of the code; assessing undertakings submitted by individual network 
service providers; and regulating network pricing for transmission services. 
-The NEC administrator is responsible for the development and enforcement of 
the access provisions, managing any changes to the code and liaising with the ACCC. 
-The State regulators are responsible for distribution networks, retail licenses, 
safety and environmental standards and regulating network pricing for distribution 
services. 
 
The inherent problem with third party access is preserving the advantage of the party that 
paid for the upfront costs and would like to keep priority access for its capacity.  This is the 
topic under discussion in the United States (see box 22). 
 
Box 22: United States – Discussion on access regime for generators’ lead lines  
In April 2012, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a Notice of Inquiry 
(NOI)112, requesting comments from market participants. The NOI targets generator’s lead 
lines that are built and owned by generators to transmit power from generation projects to 
the transmission network.  Now, a generator does not have to file an Open Access 
Transmission Tariff (OATT) unless it receives a request for interconnection from a third-
party and the FERC treats the generators’ lead lines on a case by case basis with no blanket 
access regime for those lead lines.  “The Commission seeks to explore whether, and, if 
so, how the Commission should revise its current policy concerning priority rights 
and open access with regard to [lead lines of generation developers]”. In particular, 
the Commission seeks options for addressing priority rights of generation 
developers for their future capacity on lead lines: should third-party interconnections 
be accommodated through an OATT framework or through an extension of the Large 
Generator Interconnection Agreement (LGIA) framework in which the existing LGIA 
provisions that govern third-party use of a transmission provider’s interconnection 
facilities would be extended to the lead lines of generators.  
 
                                                 
111
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The other challenge of a privately-financed distribution network in a context of low 
electricity access is ensuring that the new line is designed with additional capacity 
and meets the demand of the not-yet connected towns on the way; which requires 
the coordination of a mine’s development plan with that of the country. 
 
5.3 Additional generation through energy efficiency  
 
5.3.1 Sharing the burden of asset upgrading 
Additional generation capacity can come from the upgrade of existing assets or the 
expansion of the grid network, rather than through building additional generation capacity.  
This is particularly true in countries whose power source is hydropower given that 
hydropower plants are a lumpy investment (see section 2.1). The question is determining 
the party responsible for financing this upgrade. 
 
When sourcing power from the grid is not expensive and the demand from the mine is 
substantial, the mine is often interested in mobilizing its financial and technical capacity to 
contribute to the capital cost of the asset and to be compensated through reduced (or zero) 
tariffs. This has been the case in the DRC, where the electricity source is hydropower (see 
box 23).  
 
Box 23: DRC – When mining companies upgrade existing electric infrastructure 
In March 2012, Katanga Mining Ltd. announced that it signed an agreement with SNEL, 
DRC’s public utility, for a US $283.5 million loan to upgrade the DRC’s electricity generation 
and transmission networks. US$189 million will be reimbursed to the company by its 
affiliates at the mines of Kansuki and Mutanda which will utilize a substantial part of the 
new electricity produced. According to the agreement, 10% of the power generated will be 
extra and sold back to SNEL. US$261.8 million of this investment will be reimbursed 
through utility bill credits and SNEL will additionally pay interests on the loan. According 
to Katanga Mining, the new 450 MW capacity to be reached by the end of 2015 will allow a 
310,000 tonne/year copper production. 113 
 
 
5.3.2 Using the potential of smart technology  
With the dissemination of better technologies, additional generation capacity is 
more and more sought through energy efficiency with a reduction of transmission 
and distribution losses using techniques such as better isolation, retrofitting of lines and 
interconnection. In addition, smart grid technologies can improve energy efficiency by 
allowing the provision of electricity on demand, while traditional systems are designed to 
carry a constant level of electricity, regardless of whether it will be consumed at the end-
user level or not.  The mining industry has become an adapter of this technology: for 
instance, the Rocky Mountain Institute, recently contracted with the mining company Rio 
Tinto to improve the efficiency of its operations and energy infrastructure with its 
expertise in smart grid technology;114 the Oyu Tolgoi project in Mongolia (see box 1) signed 
                                                 
113Katanga Mining Limited, “Katanga Mining signs agreements to develop future power supply,” Press release, 
March 29, 2012, available at: http://www.katangamining.com/media/news-releases/2012/2012-03-29.aspx. 
114Anne McIvor, “Mining and energy,” Cleantech Magazine (September/October 2010), available at: 
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a $15 million with the engineering company ABB to upgrade the distribution lines leading 
to the mine with Flexible Alternating Current Transmission Systems (FACTS). FACTS “allow 
more power to reach consumers with minimal environmental impact, lower investment 
costs and shorter implementation times than the traditional alternative of building new 
power plants or transmission lines. They also help address voltage and frequency stability 
issues and enable the transmission system to run more efficiently.”115 
 
With demand and response mechanisms, and smart grid technologies in general, mining 
companies could evolve from simple consumers of electricity to dynamic and proactive 
producers, becoming a “prosumer”.116 As a prosumer, one is not only taking electricity from 
the grid, but also feeding the grid with electricity, enabling it to be connected while having 
the ability to operate in isolation when needed, which increases security and reliability of 
the system.  This model requires coordination between the mining industry and the 
public utility to finance this tremendous upgrade that consists in installing a smart 
grid, dynamic pricing signals on which the selling mining company can rely, storage 
facilities to ensure reliability and interconnection, standard distributed resource 
interconnection policies for each grid operator, and high-tech telecommunication 
infrastructure.117   
 
Those smart technologies would also benefit from better coordination within the mining 
industry. In Chile, the government’s efficiency targets worked as an incentive for 
companies to coordinate to co-invest in research on energy efficiency and share results 
(see box 24).  
 
Box 24: Chile – Coordination among private companies to improve energy efficiency 
Due to the energy crisis in Chile, the new government recently announced targets of energy 
efficiency improvements among industrial users in the country: reducing projected energy 
consumption through 2020 by 12%118 , targeting especially the mining industry, which 
accounts for 38% of all power produced on the central SIC and northern SING grids.  
The private sector, as a response, decided to join forces and in 2006 created the Mining 
Working Group for Energy Efficiency, a voluntary affiliation of the 13 largest mining 
companies of the national market in addition to other participants, such as the Chilean 
Chapter of the International Copper Association, the Mining Council, Country Programme 
for Energy Efficiency and the Mining Ministry.  Its objective is to promote energy efficiency 
research through technology development and innovation, disseminate results, evaluate 
pilot projects, and foster a culture of energy efficiency within the mining companies of the 
working group.119  
 
 
                                                 
115ABB, “ABB wins $15 million power transmission order in Mongolia,” Press release, January 27, 2011. 
116
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(June 26, 2012), paper available at:  http://www.esat.kuleuven.be/electa/publications/fulltexts/pub_2072.pdf. 
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119Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, “Compendium of energy efficiency policies of APEC economies” (2010), 
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6. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUE: PUBLIC- PRIVATE COORDINATION  
Whether miners make significant purchases of electricity from the national grid or sell 
their extra-capacity to the grid, it represents an opportunity for the country’s power 
infrastructure. In the first case, it ensures stability of demand and incentives to increase the 
supply; in the second case, it allows cheaper grid electricity. For these opportunities to be 
maximized there is a need of coordination and integration of the companies’ plan into the 
government plans. More coordination and planning at the outset could better realize 
opportunities of shared platforms and scale economies.   
 
For instance, prior to the civil war in Liberia, for example, Bong mines used to buy 
electricity from the grid during one part of the year and sell during the rest.  During the wet 
season, Bong mines would purchase Mount Coffee hydropower energy from the national 
grid (LEC) and sell thermal power to LEC during the dry season. The arrangement was 
mutually advantageous: it allowed LEC to sell excess capacity from hydropower in the wet 
season and Bong mines to benefit from cheaper electricity. At the same time, by purchasing 
electricity from Bong mines in the dry season, LEC could benefit from economies of scale in 
generating thermal power.120 
 
In Panama, a new project expects to supply power to the grid during the first years, which 
mutually benefits the company and the country, but will buy from the grid after its tenth 
year of operation (see box 25), giving time to the country to build the required 
infrastructure.  
 
Box 25: Panama – Sourcing from own-generation or the grid according to 
circumstances 
Cobre Panama Project aims to be the largest private investment in Panama. With a total 
investment of more than US$5 billion, the mine will produce 255,000 tons of copper per 
year. 
 
The project involves a 300MW thermoelectric plant as well as a transmission line from the 
plant to the mine, connected to the Llano Sanchez substation on the Panamanian grid. 121 
During the first nine years, the power plant will supply 100% of the mine’s electricity 
requirements and will sell the excess, around 40-50MW according to the company’s 
projections, to the National Integrated System (Sistema Integrado Nacional, SIN)122 
obtaining utility bill credits in exchange. The power plant is expected to produce electric 
power at an average life-of-mine cost of ¢US4.43/kWh, resulting in significant cost savings 
for the company compared to an average cost of ¢US10/kWh in Panama.123 The cost 
savings will also translate into lower energy costs to the customer since in the Panamanian 
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spot market, electricity price is given by the cost of production of the last generating unit 
dispatched.124  
The mine will also buy from the grid 1) during power plant maintenance activities, which 
happens normally during the wet season when there is an oversupply of energy on the grid 
and 2) when the energy requirements will increase as the mine start to access lower grade 
ore – which will happen after the   tenth year according to companies’ plans. 125  The 
company anticipates that within ten years, the electricity from the grid will be cheap 
enough and their demand so high that sourcing from the grid will be more economical.  
 
It remains unclear if the Liberian and Panama situations are the result of integration of 
companies’ and government’s plans, but the two situations reveal that coordination results 
in cost savings for both parties. 
 
Coordination can also take the form of a government bringing support to the mining 
industry by supplying the feedstock to increase the capacity of own-generation plant 
beyond the needs of the project.  Saudi Arabia (box 26) and Afghanistan (box 27) are two 
illustrations. 
 
Box 26: Saudi Arabia – Mutually beneficial partnership 
Saudi Electricity projects an increase from 193GWh in 2009 to 251GWh in 2013 in the 
country power consumption. Markets estimates also suggest that desalination capacity in 
the country needs to double over the next 20 years to cover drinking water alone.126 
 
A joint venture project with the American aluminum producer Alcoa and Ma’aden, a 50% 
Saudi Government company, will help the government increase power generation and 
desalination capacity. The US$10.8 billion project includes a bauxite mine, an alumina 
refinery, an aluminum smelter and a rolling mill. To ensure sufficient power and water 
supply, Ma’aden signed an agreement with the state-owned companies, SEC (Saudi 
Electricity Company) and SWCC (Saline Water Conversion Corporation) and to construct a 
joint power and desalination plant in RasAz-Zawr that will generate 2,400 MW of 
electricity and 11.025 million cubic meters of desalinated water a day. Ma’aden will use 
1,350 MW of electricity and 25,000 cubic meters of desalinated water a day, while SEC and 
SWCC will use the remainder.  The larger scale of the project will benefit from economies of 
scale, and therefore increase energy efficiency. The joint project will also benefit from 
water supply and delivery of electricity six months earlier than the original schedule.127 
The project was originally powered with fuel oil at a cost of US$40/MWh, but the 
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government allocated a supply of gas to the project, reducing the cost of energy to 
US$/24MWh. With the support of the government, Ma’aden is set to become the world’s 
lowest-cost producer of aluminum and di-ammonium phosphate fertilizer (DAP).128 
 
In Afghanistan, a country with low electrification rates, the government agreed to supply 
adequate coal to some mining projects. On the counterpart, those companies will use their 
expertise to build transmissions lines to important cities and deliver electricity at cost (see 
box 27).  
 
Box 27: Afghanistan – Free coal in exchange of power infrastructure 
In 2008, the Ministry of Mines from Afghanistan signed a US$ 3.3 billion deal with China 
Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) to explore and process Aynak copper deposits in 
the Logar province.129 From May 2008 to August 2010, both parties negotiated and signed 
five ancillary agreements, including contracts dealing with security, water, power and coal 
mines, other minerals, and a railway.  The power and coal mining ancillary agreements 
envision MCC to build and operate a 400MW coal fired power plant and the coal mine to 
feed it. MCC will also pay for the transmission system to bring the power to the grid and to 
Kabul City: a 220KV two-circuit high-tension transmission line, with total distance of 
280km. Transmission lines will be constructed to deliver 200MW to Aynak while the other 
200MW will be distributed on the national grid in Kabul for use by ratepayers.130   
 
According to the power supply agreement, the government is responsible in providing 
sufficient coal reserves to MCC with no less than 100 million tons of coal to meet the 
demand for constructing a 400MW thermal power plant. About three coal mines will 
provide the 1.2 million tons per year of coal to the project.  Another mining project in the 
country, Hajigak, employs the same design but in this case, 50% of the power will also be 
provided to the community at cost.131  
 
The main purpose of those projects is to provide power to the mining projects and supply 
the surplus capacity to the government at cost price in order to promote local economic 
development.   
 
The benefits of coordination and integration of companies’ plans into government plans 
can also be observed when looking at the counterfactual. While the government strategy 
remains in disconnection from the mining industry’s plans, Chile suffers from a continuous 
energy crisis (see box 28). 
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Box 28: South of Chile – Mines suffer from a non-integrated grid  
In the early eighties, Chile drastically privatized its electricity sector and created a 
competitive environment. However, after years of underinvestment, the electrical grid has 
become costly and fragile. As a result, the Chilean copper industry has to rely on more 
expensive forms of energy, such as diesel, which are twice as expensive as coal.132  
 
Chile's mining industry has been asking for grid integration for many years since it would 
enable projects in the north to access cheaper power from hydroelectric and renewable 
energy on the Southern grid. 133 It could bring energy costs down by 4.1% on average 
throughout the SIC and SING, and offer an important solution to the power needs of the 
mining sector. Until now, the IPR-GDF Suez is the only firm to have offered proposals on the 
interconnection. The project is a 570km double circuit transmission line and would cost 
about US$ 600 million. Whether the project will be financially viable, depends on the 
energy demand from mining companies but in any event the Chilean government is not 
interested in financially contributing to the cost for now. 134 
 
In Pilbara, Australia, the lack of coordination between companies in addition to the lack of 
government involvement in the interconnection of the grids prevents the industry from 
gaining massive cost savings (see box 29). 
 
Box 29: Pilbara, Australia – Missed opportunity 
According to recent studies, 3,000 MW of new capacity will be required by 2020 to meet 
the demand of new mining projects in Pilbara, mainly related to iron ore.  Iron ore miners 
have been historically responsible for the provision of their entire infrastructure.135 In 
addition because of the long distances between loads and high management and operation 
costs due to frequent cyclonic activity and high ambient temperatures, Pilbara has never 
benefited from an interconnected network. This explains why some transmission lines run 
on parallel routes, not connected and with different voltages. Without central coordination, 
some sections of the network have excess capacity, while other sections are heavily 
constrained. 136 
 
Nevertheless, as the number and scale of loads increase, the case to develop a coordinated 
network grows stronger and the relative costs drop significantly. Studies suggest that “an 
integrated transmission system with large-scale efficient generation, compared to a gas 
pipeline with isolated generation, could reduce daily gas consumption in the Pilbara by 
186-573 TJ as of 2019”.  In addition, it would provide electricity more economically and 
with greater reliability. Having multiple generators with different cost characteristics 
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supplying electricity into an open access and common-user network would allow for the 
optimal cost generation to be selected at any time. It would also enable small to medium-
sized mining projects that could not otherwise economically justify individual power 
generation.137 
 
The government of Western Australia has not excluded the option of an integrated 
electrical grid, but contends that the private sector should pay for it. All earlier attempts to 
develop a bigger network have failed because of the lack of a suitable third party 
facilitator138 as well as different time horizons for new projects, which diminishes the 
opportunity for some multi-user facilities. This is exacerbated by the competitive nature of 
the mining industry, as they compete to have their respective projects developed earlier 
and thus gain market share.139  
 
Even when the government is willing to coordinate and plan with the industry, the mining 
projects are so time-sensitive that waiting for government plans often present a 
substantive loss from delays, acting as a disincentive to coordinate. The desire to avoid this 
wait was what encouraged Karara mining (see box 30) to quickly engage in the financing of 
power infrastructure for the Mid-West project. The company did not try to set up a joint-
financing project with the public utility, but rather relied on the creditworthiness of the 
utility to be reimbursed later on.   
 
Box 30: Western Australia – Karara Mining participates in the Mid-West Energy 
project to accelerate the process 
The Mid-West Energy Project (MWEP) 140 is one of the largest transmission line projects 
ever undertaken in Western Australia. The goal is to build transmission lines to overcome 
the current capacity constraints on the existing lines, connect the different power 
generators of the region, and link them to the new mining operations. The lines are funded 
jointly by the Western Australian State Government and Karara Mining Limited (KML) 
through different arrangements. KML developed the $1.2 bn Karara Iron Ore Project and 
financed, built and owns the 105 km 330 kV high voltage line from its mining operations to 
the town of Three Springs. On behalf of Western Power, KML also financed and built the 
Terminal Substation at Three Springs and extended the 330 kV line from this Substation to 
the town of Eneabba, where the line connects to the public network operated by the public 
utility Western Power. KML will be reimbursed later on by Western Power. Thus, KML will 
be supplied in electricity by Western Power that will use its State electricity grid to 
transmit power to Three Springs and then to the mine via KML’s 330kV line. 
 
To explain its participation, KML said: “By building and funding the line itself, Karara 
ensured its power supply would be in place well before it was needed, removing risks 
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associated with relying on third parties to provide crucial infrastructure. This is also 
another excellent example of the flow-on benefits that come from the development of 
major resource projects such as Karara, with the construction of this new 330kV 
transmission line acting as a key catalyst for the first stage of Western Power’s MWEP, 
which will ultimately benefit communities across the Midwest region with greater security 
and reliability of supply.” 141 
 
In Western Australia, in an attempt to accelerate the planning process and optimize 
coordination with companies, the government has introduced Development Assessment 
Panels. These panels consist of two local government counselors and three independent 
experts with technical knowledge. These DAPs help improve the planning system by 
providing more transparency, consistency and reliability in decision-making. In terms of 
power generation, projects that cost more than US$ 7 million, outside Perth, must be 
assessed by the Panel, but is optional for smaller projects142. 
 
Another interesting initiative to ensure multilevel coordination both within government 
agencies and between government agencies, the mining industry, and civil society is in 
Mongolia, where the government together with the World Bank, proposed the creation of 
specialized institutions to oversee the national infrastructure development process (see 
box 31).  
 
Box 31: Mongolia – An institutional framework for more efficient planning 
In Mongolia, the government is organizing negotiation forums with the mining industry to 
oversee infrastructure developments and define priorities, with plans to create new 
institutions to further this goal as described below.  One body will be granted with the right 
to take the lead with regards to infrastructure development decisions, and implement the 
overall integrated development plan that each of the following agencies would then be 
charged to implement according to its particular specialization: 
 
Southern Mongolia Infrastructure Council. The Council would consist of representatives 
from the national government, local governments, mining companies, and NGOs. Its goal 
would be to serve as a forum for public consultation and exchange of information. It would 
be developed either as an advisory committee or as an entity that makes decisions and 
finances infrastructure developments.  
Southern Mongolia Infrastructure Coordination Unit. This entity would serve as an 
information forum to coordinate the multiple levels of local government, and would be 
entitled to step in the decision-making process to accelerate it, 
PPP Unit. This unit would have expertise in PPP developments to compensate for the lack 
of expertise of Mongolia in this field.  
Risk Management Unit. Since investors in PPP transactions typically request government 
guarantees, this unit would specialize in the negotiation of government guarantees for 
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PPPs, and it would set caps on governmental risk exposure. In particular, this unit would 
report to the government, annually on the extent and probability of its liabilities. 
International Infrastructure Expert Advisory Panel. To make sure that the government 
is negotiating the best deals, it might call on a panel of international experts to review cases 
on a case-by-case basis.  
Economic Regulation Agency. This agency would have an expertise in tariff setting in the 
railway and electricity sectors.  
Southern Mongolia Groundwater Management and Information Center. This agency 
would be charged with gathering information on groundwater from all the other 





This Working Paper has set out preliminary findings on appropriate commercial, financial, 
technical and regulatory models to leverage the mining industry’s energy demand either to 
improve the availability and reliability of the grid or expand electricity access solutions for 
the community. Further research144 will include examining more closely the scope for cost 
savings for the country and the company of the different institutional arrangements, laying 
the emphasis on a quantitative analysis of the different situations. 
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